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Summary findings
Bcrry and Levy  survcy  a samplc of 91 small  or medium-  example,  support for participation  in trade fairs The
size exportEcrs  of garments,  rattan furniture,  and carved  Ministry  of Trade's international  network of offices
wooden furniture Uepara),  and interview  people in  geared to providing  information  and fxiliiating
public  and nonprofit agencies  active about issues  transactions  was of litde use to the firms  survcyed.
affecting  small and medium-size  enterprises  (SMEs).  Collective  technology  support also appeared to be
Indonesia's  garment industry is dominated  by  somewhat  more important for smaller,  pribumi firms,
entrepreneurs of Chinese  descent and the Jepara industry  although its impact  was modest.  Employing  expatriates
by pribumi  Indonesian  Malays);  in rattan furniture, the  was a powerful  mechanism  for acquiring  technological
two are reasonably  equally mixed.  About 75 percent of  capability,  especially  in the ratan and garment sectors,
the entrepreneurs  in garments  and rattan furniture  have  although it was concentrated disproportionately  among
some university  education; less  than half of those in the  the non-pribumi-entrepreneurs
more  tradition-l, skill-based  Jepara industry do.  Indonesia's  collective  institutions  suffer  from pervasive
Tn  most of the firms,  international marketing  was  organizational  weaknesses  that limit  their ability to help
handled  exclusively  through private  channels;  that is also  broaden the base of private  entrepreneurship  in small
how most firms acquired technological  capability-  But  and medium-size  firms. Public  insitutions generally  lack
such channels  appeared  to be more readily  accessible  by  the commitment,  resources,  and flexibility  needed to
la-rger  firms,  by educated entrepreneurs,  and by non-  provide  quality  support to SMEs,  and the industry
pribumi who could take advantage  of the extended-  associations  often lack the professionalism  and
family  network that connects  ethnic Chinese in the  accountability  needed to gain  SMEs' confidence.
rcgion. Relying  exclusively  on private channels  means  But public  support can be useful  when it involves
running the risk  that participation  in export markets  will  relatively  simple services,  such as support to organize
be limited  to a relatively  narrow base of entrepreneurs.  local fairs,  to facilitare  participation  in fairs  abroad, or to
Pribumi  and smaller firms relied heavily  on collective  use foreign  prvate consultants.
markleting  support provided  with a 'light touch-  for
This paper - a product of the Finance  and Private Sectr  Development  Division,  Policy  Research  Department -is  part
of a larger effort in the department  to examine the inpact of proactive  intervention on SME  performance.  Copies  of the
paper are available  firee  from the World Bank, 18918  H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact  Daniele  Evans,
room N9-O55,  extension  38526 (68 pages).  December  1994.
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1. T' ROD'CTION
The goals of this  paper  are  three-fold.  One  is  to  highlight  the  role  and
potential  of  a  crucial  class  of  economic  actors  --  dynamic  small  and  medium
enterprises  (SMEs).  Both  in  its  industrial  structure  and  its  policy
orientation,  Indonesian  industry  has  long  been  characterized  by  a  "missing
middle".  Aggregate  industrial  structure  is  dualistic,  with  employment  and
output  concentrated  among  large  firms  and  micro-enterprises,  and  only  modest-
contributions  by  SMEs.  Special  incentives,  opportunities  and  subsidies  have
been  provided  to  large  business  groups  and  to  large-scale  public  industrial
enterprises,  and  there  hbs been  a  long  series  of  progranumatic  and  regulatory
interventions  in  support  of  microenterprises.  But  dynamic  and  independent  SMEs
typically  lack  the  political  influence  to  enjoy  the  benefits  of  special
incentives,  and  are  too  large  for  the  assistance  to  microenterprises  to  be  of
much  value.  (indeed,  as  will  be  seen,  most  dynamic  SMEs do  not  emerge  by
graduating  from  the  ranks  of  microenterprises).  Yet  the  benefits  to  Indonesia
of  a  broad  base  of  dynamic,  independent  entrepreneurs  would  be  substantial  --
especially  if  pribumis  comprised  a  significant  share  of  these  entrepreneurs,
along  with  those  of  Chinese  origin.  A  dynamic  middle  of  entrepreneurship  would
help  build  a  strong.middle  class  that  could.increasingly  immunize  the.society
from  the  twin  perils  of  rent-seeking  by  an  unaccountable  elite,  and  etbnic
resentment  leading  to  the  implosion  of  a  private-sector  led  development
strategy  in which non-pribumi  are  perceived  to  be  the  main  beneficiaries-2
A second  goal is micro-level  stocktaking.  Analysis  of trends  in economic
policies  and  performance  over the duration  of Indonesia's  recent  outward-
oriented  industrial  surge  has  been abundant  at the  aggregate  level.  Yet
surprisingly  little  is  known  as  to  what  lies  behind  these  aggregate
statistics:  who  are  the  new  export  participants?  how  is  industrial
organization  changing  in  the  emerging  sectors?  what  features  of  the  micro-
environment  have  been  most  supportive  --  and  most  disruptive  --  of export
efforts?  This  section  will  provide  detailed  micro-level  information  (collected
via  firm  surveys)  on  those  aspects  of  industrial  organization  and  the  micro-
environment  for  exporters  that  are.of  special  relevance  for  SMEs.
A  third  goal  is  to  evaluate  micro-level  policy  for  SMEs,  especially  for
SME exporters.  Indonesia's  "first  generation"  of  policy  reforms  focused
appropriately  on  macro  and  trade  policies.  However,  with  the  maturing  of  these
micro-reforms  the  question  arises  as  to  whether  micro-level  policies  and
institutions  are  adequately  supportive  of  SMEs.  Particular  attention  will  be-
given  to  the  operation  of  marketing,  technological  and  financial  supDort
systems  for  SMEs.  Large  enterprises  typically  have  resources  and  functional
skills  within  the  firm  to  explore  and  exploit  opportunities  available  in  the
market.  But,  lacking  such  resources  and  skills,  SMEs may  benefit  significantly
from  support  systems  --  both  private  and  public  networks  external  to  the  firm
--  to  complement  their  internal  efforts.  The  questions  thus  arise  as  to  what
have  been  the  marketing,  technological  and  financial  support  systems  that  have
so  far  facilitated  dynamism  by  Tndonesia's  SMEs,  and  whether  the  existing
support  systems  are  adequate  to  sustain  SME  dynamism  in  the  future.  This
section  will  analyze  the  micro-environment  for  SME exporters,  and  suggest  some
reforms  that  could  accelerate  participation  in  Indonesia's  manufactures  export3
boom  of  SME exporters  in  general,  and  smaller  and  pribumi  exporters  in
particular.
The  next  section  reviews  the  political  economy  background  against  which
policy  towards  SMEB has  been  formulated.  Section  three  describes  the
methodology  for  the  in-depth  analysis  of  SME exporters  in  three  subsectors  of
industry.  Section  four  provides  an  overview  of  each  ,Rctor,  who  the  SME
exporters  are,  and  how  they  have  performed.  Section  five  examines  the
mechanisms  via  which  SMEs have  penetrated  export  markets,  and  makes  some
recommendations  as  to  the  role  of  government  in  strengthening  marketing
support  systems.  Section  six  explores  mechanisms  and  policies  relevant  to  the
acquisition  by  firms  of  the  technological  capability  they  need  to  compete.
Section  seven  analyzes  the  financial  support  system  for  SME exporters  and  will
incorporate  some  suggestions  as  to  how  it  might  be  strengthened.  Section  eight
concludes.
2.  HISTORY.  POLICY  AND OTHER DEMNANTS  OF  INDONESAIS  INDUSTR
The  current  patterns  and  many  of  the  recent  trends  in  Indonesia's
industrial  structure  and  in  the  place  of  SMEs within  that  structure,  reflect  a
combination  of  deep-seated  features  of  the  society,  related  aspects  of
industrial  policy  and  accidents  of  political  and  economic  history  (Robinson,
1985;  McIntyre, 1990).  The  ethnic  make-up  of  the  society  and  the  tensions
associated  therewith  are  often  central  to  the  story.
Manufacture  in  the colonial  period consisted  of household  production,
dominated  by  indigenous  producers,  small-scale  and  largely  unmechanized
manufacture  dominated  by  the  Chinese,  and  large  scale  production  dominated  by
foreign  capital.  Until the 1930s  most  local  manufacture  took  the  first  form.4
But the indigenous  producers gradually  lost out to the larger  mechanized
factories  controlled  by foreign  capital  or,  most often and  most directly, the
medium  and  small scale factories  owned by the Chinese.  Frequently  the
indigenous  merchants and commodity  producers  organized  politically  in defense
of their interests,  but this resistance  had at most a brief delaying  effect,
since the technologies  to which they  were tied were competitive  only as long
as capital  was extremely  scarce. -While  the Chinese  met with much business  and
industrial  success,  they, like the indigenous  groups,  were unable to establish
themselves  as a national bourgeoisie. Their activities  remained  primarily
mercantile  in.  nature  and  family-based  in structure.
At  Independence  the  country's  factory  manufacturing  sector  was  very
small,  local  private  capital  was  very-limited,  and  the  main  reservoir  of
entrepreneurial  talents  lay  in  the  Chinese  community,  not  a  group  to  which  the
new  government  would  give  the  task  of  developing  the.  industrial  sector..
Accordingly,  the  state  becr"e  a  major  actor  in  industrial  development  in
collaboration  with  the  military,  with  politically  powerful  pribumi  figures,
with  leading  Chinese  economic  groups,  and  with  foreign  capital;  the  relative
importance  of  these  collaborating  groups  has  varied  according  to  time  and
circumstance. Until the reforms  of the  1980s  the  manufacturing  policy  was
protectionist  and interventionist  in character;  the well-placed  were the  main
beneficiaries  of  a  highly  patronage-based  and  rent-seeking  system.  On
occasion  marginal  groups,  usually  under  siege  from  an  ongoing  economic
transition,  were  able  to  push  the  government  to  recognize  their  interests,  but
the  resources  channelled  in their  direction  were  always  small  in comparison  to
those reaching  the in-group. When the oil  boom relaxed fiscal  constraints  in
the 1970s,  substantial  programs  in support  of microenterprise  were developed;5
only later  and on a  more modest  scale  was a  credit  program directed
specifically  at SMEs.
The  vested interests  of the  powerful  have  been complemented  by strong
persistent  strands of economic  ideology  in Indonesia  favoring  some or all of
capital intensive  industries,  technologically  advanced  ones, and strategic
ones (especially  the engineering  sector).  Industrial  policy.has-been
characterized  by marked swings,  from  xenophobia  to a more liberal  regime (end
of the 1960s)  to the  grandiose  plans  of the  early 1980s  to the recent
liberalism;  elements  of continuity  have been the typically  strong  doses of
pragmatism,  nepotism,  and dirigisme.  The main groups  purveying alternative
strategies  have been the "technocrats"  at the Department  of Finance  and
BAPPENAS,  who tend to favour  a market-oriented  regime;  the."nationalists",
located  in  key  line  ministries  like  Trade  and  Industry,  the  powerful  state
secretariat  and  the  vocal press,  who have favored  regulation,  protection  and
more import  substitution,  partly  reflecting  the  self-interest  of specific
groups  and partly  a deep mistrust  of laissez  faire,  among  whose various roots
is  the  non-pribumi  domination  of  much  of  the  modern  economy;  and a somewhat
amorphous  group which advocates  a bold strategy  focused  on large technology
intensive  projects-designed  to  overcome  the  country's  perceived  backwardness,
and  involving  a  vision  of  an  Indonesian  industrial.super-state  (Hill,  1991,
21).  The  modern  corporate  economy  is  increasingly  dominated  by  a  number  of
large conglomerates  with widely dispersed  activities  in  industry  and  commerce,
and some in plantations,  real estate,  and finance. Most have substantial
offshore  investments,  especially  in Singapore  and Hong Kong.  Though  there has
been special  support  over the  years for  pribumi  business, it has had the
effect  more of channelling  rents  to this group than of building  up its capital6
and entrepreneurial  base;  to  of the top  40 private  groups  are pribumi.
Whether Chinese or pribumi, the  large firma tend to owe their success in
significant  degree to their  having  good ties with the state,  since the high
degree  of government  involvement  in regulation,  protection,  licensing,  etc.,
and the corruption  which typically  goes with some of these functions  make such
ties mandatory for success.  Most medium size firms  are also Chinese,  it
appears,  though  here there appear  to be no very accurate  date.  As our results
will show, the Chinese firms  tend to need less  positive support from
government  since they are relatively  well hooked  into financial,  marketing and
informational  networks  of  their  ethnic  group  at  the  national  or  regional
level;  they do need "protection"  from political  and/or  bureaucratic  attack
however.  Medium  and large  pribumi tend to depend  in a-more  positive  way on
government for special  favours,  for subsidized  credit,  etc., since they do not
have an ethnic network  on which  they can  draw  as  the  Chinese  do-
Much  of  the  interest  in  micro-  and  small-scale  industry  (as  opposed  to
middle-sized  SHEs) has  derived  from  the  policy  objectives  of  equity,  promotion
of  pribumi firms and support  for weak economic  groups.  Although successive
-enciJta~  have placed great  rhetorical  emphasis  on this sector,  most of the
programs implemented  have been less than impressive. With a high share of
available capital channelled  to the large,  capital-intensive  firms,  those
parts of the manufacturing  sector  producing  at the other end of the size
structure  have  traditionally  had  to  make  do  with  nothing  but  the  tiny  amounts
of  capital  they themselves  can accumulate.  The  highly touted  sub-contractinog
programs  and  the  foster-parent  scheme  have  been  Ovirtually  shelved"'.  Various
'Hal  Hill,  "Indonesia's  Industrial  Transformation:  Part  II",  Bulletin  ot
Indonesian  Economic  Studies.  Vol. 26,  No. 3, December, 1990,  23.7
targeted  credit  programs  have been designed  for  small enterprise,  including
the costly  and elaborate  KXK AND KMXP credit  schemes  which have been gradually
eliminated  in the  banking  reforms  since 1983.  The recent  SMXE project is the
first line of credit  directed  especially  to the  middle-sized  establishment;
its impact  has not been carefully  assessed  thus far, to the best of our
knowledge.
Various other  programs  have been established  to aid small industry,
including  industrial  training  and demonstration  programs like the Textile
Technology  Institute  in Bandung,  and.several  Small Industry  Centers (Hill,
1991, 46).. Reservation  schemes  have been.mooted  but never introduced. other
measures  have been in force  periodically,  such as a stipulation  that state
tertile  mills set aside a certain  portion  of their  yarn, at specified  prices,
for small-scale  weavers.  Such assistance  has often  been nullified  by other
government  policies  which discriminate  against  small firms,  such as the
licensing  system  and the general  level of corruption.  The schemes  tended also
to  be  uncoordinated  with  each  other.
Policy  is  now  pro-trade  and  a  p6werful  export  lobby  has  for  the  first
time  emerged,  demanding  a  commercial  environment  conducive  to  international
competitiveness.  The  licenses,  controls  and  protection  under  the  jurisdiction
-of  the  Ministries of Industry  and  of  Trade  are  now  less  central  then  before.
Yet the outward oriented  approach  may  or may not create the conditions  for
SMEs to make a stronger  contribution  than in the  past, depending  on how well
its support  needs are  met.  Amidst  the rapid shifts  of policy in recent  years,
and given the lack of a strong  or articulate  force  lobbying  on behalf  of SMEs,
it is easy to believe that its interests  and  needs might get short shrift.  Asto the  degree  of success  of pribumi  business  under the  emerging  new set  of
policies,  only anecdotal  evidence  is thus far  available.
. =(  O'  .or
Since  available  aggregate  statistics  throw  little  light  on the character
and potential  for  dynamism  of Indonesia's  SMEs,  or on  the  micro-environment  in
which they  operate,  between  January  and  June l992  World Bank staff,  together
with members  of the Institute  for  Economic  and  Social  Research  at the
University  of Indonesia,  surveyed  91 SHE  exporters  in three  subsectors  of
manufacturing,  and conducted  intensive  interviews  with 30-40  public  and  non-
profit agencies  active  in SME issues.
One  reason  for  the choice  of SME  exporters  as our object  of study  was
the desire  to learn  more about the forces  underlying  Indonesia's  export
dynamism,  whether  and how it could  be sustained  over the longer-term,  and who
were the likely  participants.  A second,  and  more fundamental,  reason  was  a
desire  to focus  on the  adequacy  of the support  environment  from the
perspective  of successful  SMEo;  as discussed  in the overview  paper for the
comparative  research  project  of which  this  study  is a  part,  participation  in
export  markets  can  be a useful  proxy for  success.  An obvious  limitation  of
this research  strategy  is that it can shed  little  or no light  on the  micro-
environment  --  and the impact  of government  and other  collective  intervention
on that environment  --  for  SMEs  oriented  towards  the domestic  market.
Since  the character  of SME support  systems  and the  priority  needs  of
firms depend  in part an the specific  features  of individual  subsectors,  the
research  was  organized  around  subsectoral  analysis  --  but  with  an  effort.to
achieve  as  much  diversity  as  possible  in  the characteristics  of the selected9
subsectors.  The  research  initially  focused  on  seven  oubsectors  --  garments,
carved  wooden  furniture,  rattan  furniture,  shrimp  cultivation,  footwear,
automobile  components  and  textiles.  However,  exports  of  automobile  components
from Indonesia  were virtually  non-existent  and, contrary  to expectations (and
the  pattern in other countries)  footwear  and textile  exports  were dominated  by
.large  firms,  with  virtually  no  SME  participation.  Consequently,  the field
research  was  conducted  in  the  garment, rattan  furniture,  and carved  wooden
furniture  (specifically  from  Jepara)  subsectors.  The  difficulty  of  identifying
suitable  candidates  for  the  research  implies  that  it  would  be  mistaken  to
extrapolate  from  the  results  below  and conclude  that  SME dynamism  is
ubiquitous  in  Indonesian  industry.
For  the  garment  and  rattan  studies,  it  was  decided  to  survey  firms  in
two  sites  (Jakarta  and  Bandung  for  garments,  Jakarta  and  Surabaya  for  rattan);
for  carved  wooden  furniture,  Jepara,  a  traditional  center  of  wood  carving  in
Indonesia,  was  chosen.  These  decisiots.having  been  taken,.  every  effort  was
made  to  select  the  sample  in  as  random  a  way  as  possible,  and  especially  to
work  against  a  bias  of  including  a  disproportionate  sample  of  firms  that  were
contactable  via  public  agenciec  or  industry  associations  (and  most  likely  to-
report  favorably  on  their  activities).  Subject  to  the  constraints,  every
effort  was  made  to  sample  as  diverse  a  group  of  exporters  as  possible.  Even
so,  pribumi  firms  probably  are  oversampled,  in part because  we made a special
effort  to  seek  out  pribami  exporters,  and  in  part  because  suspicion  as  to  the
purposes  of  the  interview  appeared  especially  marked  among  some  non-pribumi  -
firms.  The  sample  is  also  probably  biased  away  from  firms  experiencing
difficulties  in  their  export  efforts  or  in  their  overall  performance.10
4.  SUBESCTOR  AND SAMPLE  CHARACTERISTICS
This  subsection  reviews  in  turn  for  each  of  the  three  subsectors  the
characteristics  and  experiences  of  the  surveyed  firms.  While  there  are
substantial  differences  from  case-to-case,  four  general  features  seem  evident:
i  First,  it  is  not  the  case  that  successful  SMEs are  to  be  found
only  among  non-pribumi  entrepreneurs.  While  the  garment  industry
indeed  appears  to  be  dominated  by  non-pribumi  firms  (although  our
sample  includes  a  smattering  of  pribumis),  the  field  survey
uncovered  a  substantial  minority  of  pribumis  among  rattan
exporters,-and  revealed  that  carved  furniture  exports  from  Jepara
are  eominated  by  pribumi  firms.-
*  Second,  in  both  the  garment  and  rattan  cases,  SME entrepreneurs
tended  to  be  highly  educated,  with  more  than  70% having  had  at
least  some university  education.  Correspondingly,  there  were
virtually  no  instances  in either  sector  of firms  that  had  begun as
microentrepreneurs  or  small  subcontractors  graduating  to  become
fully  fledged  direct  exporters.  For.  reasons  outlined  further
below,  the  Jepara  case  provides  a  partial  exception  to  these
patterns.
Third (again  with the  partial  exception  of  Jepara),  the  surveys
uncovered  a  sharp  bifurcation  between  firms  that  produced  for  the
domestic  market,  and  those  that  focused  on  exports.  Most  of  the
firms  surveyed  exported  virtually  all  of  their  output,  and  very
few  of  them  cut  their  teeth  in  the domestic  market  before  moving
on  to  exports.
*  Fourth,  in  all  three  subsectors,  growth  among  the  firms  surveyed
was  rapid.  While  to  some  degree  the  uniformly  strong  performance
may be an artifact-of  sample  bias,  the results  demonstrate  clearly
that the  benefits  of  outward-orientation  are  not  monopolized  by
the  largest  firms.  On  the  contrary,  all  three  sectors  showed
evidence  of  a  nascent  and  dynamic  class  of  new  SME  entrepreneurs.
Indonesia's  SME Exnorters  of Rattan  Furniture
Indonesia  has long  produced  a  wide range  of rattan  produc._s  for  domestic
use.  However,  these  have  been goods  of low  quality,  used  by low income
consumers,  and supplied  by small-scale  enterprises,  using  quite  simple  tools
and lower  quality raw  materials.  Rattan  furniture  was not widely  used in thecountry  (the  climate  is  not  kind  to  it),  and  was  not  purchased  by  middle  and
upper  income  families.
Despite  these  limitations,  several  Jakarta-based  firms  pioneered  exports
of rattan  products  in the 1970s;  most were led  by pribumi entrepreneurs.  These
pioneers  were not, however,  the prime  movers  behind  the 'take-off"  of
Indonesian  exports  of rattan  furniture  which occured in  the second  half of the
198Os.  In part, this take-off  was a response  to the broad  policy  reforms
described  earlier.  But  at least  as crucial  were  bans on exports  of rattan
material.
Indonesia  has  long  been  a  major  supplier  of  raw  rattan  to the  major
rattan  furniture  exporting  countries  of  Taiwan  and  the  Philippines.  In  an
effort  to  'jump-start'  the  rattan  products  industry,  the  Indonesian  goverment
imposed  bans  on  the  export  of  unprocessed  and  semi-processed  rattan,  in  1986
and 1988-9  respectively.  While from  a public  policy  perapective  its costs  may
well have exceeded  its social  benefits,  the evidence  seems  unequivocal  that
the  ban  led  to  a  major  expansion  in  rattan  furniture  exports.  The  growth  and
changing  size structure  of the industry  in  the  1980s  is  revealed  in  Table  I1
(although  many  smaller  firms are  probably  missed).  Output  of rattan  furniture
and  related  rattan  products  has  grown  very  fast  over  the  period  since  about
1983 (accelerating  in anticipation  of  the  bans),-though  the  absolute  level  of
output  was not very large  until the late lg80s  and exports  exceeded  U.S.  100
million only in 1989.2 While in 1981,  there  were no establishments  with more
2  We have not  been able to obtain  official  export  statistics  for  rattan
furniture  alone.  total furniture  exports,  of which  the bulk are  of  rattan,
give a good idea of the tiends.  World  Bank data (World  Bank, Report  No. 9498-
IND, Indonesia:  Develoninci  Private  Enternrise,  May, 1991,  p.138)  are as
follows (in  U.S. millions):
1985  7.1
1986  9.212
than 500 workers,  by 1987 there were 15,  which together  accounted  for 31% of
output.
The export explosion  in the late 1980Os  brought a new set of participants
into the industry.  Some former  traders  in raw rattan  switched  to the
production of the semi-processed  item,  and subsequently  of final  goods;  most
of these were Chinese.  Some pribumi rattan  collectors  also went into
production.  Immediately  following  the  export  bans,  a  leading  business  group
set  up  a  number  of  large  rattan  furniture  export  factories.  As  the  industry
expanded  Surabaya,  a  port  from  which  raw  and  semi-processed  rattan  had
forrmerly  been  exported,  began  to  rival  Jakarta  as  a  major  center  of
production.  And  export  producers  also  began  to  penetrate  Ciribon,  which  had
long  been  a  traditional  center  of  rattan  handicraft.
A  total  of  33  rattan  product  exporters  were  interviewed,  22  in  the
Jakarta  area  and  ;1 in  Surabaya.  All  but  one  of  the  firms  sampled  exported  90%
or  more  of  their  output.  Indeed,  26  of  33  firms  began  exporting  the  same  year
they entered into production. 3
Nearly half of the 33 firms interviewed  started in 1988 or 1989,
reflecting  the great burst of activity  as the bans were imposed  on exports of
raw and semi-processed  rattan.  Seven of the sample  firms entered in the 1970s.
Only  1  entered  after  1989  --  perhaps  a  consequence  of  the  placing  of  the




1990  241.0  (estimate)
3  Earlier  entrants  were  more  likely  to  sell  for  some  years  in  the
domestic  market  before  exporting.  Four  of  the  10  firms  surveyed  that  entered
prior to 1982 produced for  at least  4  years  before  venturing  into  exports.13
closing  it to further domestic and foreign investment. Twenty-five  of the 33
firms sampled were  independent, while 8 were part of business groups;  6 of
these 8 entered between  1987 and 1991.
14 of the  firms had pribumi  entrepreneurs,  16 non-pribumi,  with  3
unspecified.  Five of the pribumi  entrepreneurs  started up their businesses  in
the 1970s. Subsequently,  non-pribumi  entrepreneurs  have played a larger role,
although even in the most recent period entry by pribumis  remains substantial.
Most of the entrepreneurs  were highly educated, with 27 of 33 having had at
least some university  education. The concentration of university-educated
entrepreneurs  was especially high among the pribumi  --  with 13 of 14 having
had at least some university  experience.  The post-1986  expansion has brought  a
new  wave  of  less  educated  entrepreneurs  (the  former  rattan  traders)  into  the
industry:  5  of  6 entrepreneurs  in  the  sample  that  failed  to  complete  secondary
school  entered  during  this  latter  period,  all  non-pribumi,  and  all  in
Surabaya.
As  Table  2  shows,  size  at  start-up  varied  widely:  7  sample  firms  began
with  10  or  fewer  workers; 1 with over 500. On  average,  pribumi  firms were  less
than  one-third  the  size  of  their  non-pribumi  counterparts  at  start-up.  Growth
since  start-up  has  generally  been  rapid:  24  firms  have  more  than  doubled  in
size; 10 firms now have  500 or more workers;  only 11 have expanded their work
force by less than 50%.
Jenara'  s Euorters  of Carved  Wooden  Furniture  and their  OrigLins
Jepara  is a densely populated,  semi-urban county of 820,000 people  in
Central Java,  an  easy  three-hour  drive  along  good  roads  from  the  port  of
Semarang,  Indonesia's  third  largest  city.  For  hundreds  of  years  before  the
17th  century  Dutch  conquest,  it  was  a  center  of  traditional  woodcarving  for14
Javanese  courts (wooden  furniture  was not an object in everyday  household use
in traditional  Indonesia).  These woodcarving  skills  have persisted to the
present day, and for the past century  or more have been incorporated  into the
production  of  heavily  carved  wooden  furniture  for  the  domestic  market.  Carned
mahogany  and  teak  furniture  from  Jepara  began  to  find  its  way  onto  world
markets  in  1986.  As  of mid-1992  exports  were estimated 4 to amount to  10-15%  of
total sales.
Jepara's  furniture  industry  is organized  into three t-iers  --- workers,
production  groups  cum  subcontractors,  and  primary  contractors.  Estimates  of
the  number  of  workers  with  carpentry  and  carving  skills  range  from  22,000  to
80,000.  As  of  1989,  there  were  1,900  registered  furniture  companies,  of which
100  reportedly  were  primary  contractors.5  While  no  data  were  available  on  the
total  value  of  domestic  or  export  sales,  extrapolating  from  the  firm  surveys
conducted  for  this  study,  $25-$40  million appears to be  a  reasonable  range  for
J-epara's  1991-2  furniture  exports.
Field  interviews  were  conducted  in  mid-1992  with  24  of  the  40  or  so
enterprises  that  had  participated  at  least  to  some  extent  in  export  markets.
All  but  5 of  the  24  firms  reported  that  exports  accounted  for  50% or  more  of
their  sales  (Table  3).  Export  level  was  bimodally  distributed:  estimated'
exports per firm  were  less  than  $250,000  annually  for  14  interviewees,  and  for
4  By  the  local  chairman  of  the  furniture  producers  association.
S The  estimate  of  1,900  formal  firms  is  from  the  Ministry  of  Industry.
The  figure  of  l00  primary  contractors  was  provided  by  the  local  chairman  of
the  furniture  industry  association.
6  In  general,  firms  were  unwilling  to  provide  explicit  estimates  of  sales
or export  nalues. However,  they  were  willing  to  provide  quantitative  estimates
(number  of  20  foot  or  40  foot  containers  exported  per  month),  and  some  of  the
more  co-operative  participants  confirmed  that  the  average  value  of  furniture
in  a  40  foot  container  was  $20-25,000.15
the  remaining  10 in excess  of $600,000.  As of 1992,  the total  annual  value of
exports  for  the surveyed  firms  was $24  million,  with the 7 largest  accounting
for  $21  million  of that  total.
The survey  revealed  that  Jeparals  furniture  export  entrepreneurs  are
overwhelmingly  local  and  pribumi:  all  but  one (an  Australian  expatriate)  of
the 24 entrepreneurs  surveyed  were Jepara  born;  of these,  only  two were  of
Chinese  origin.  Yet within  this  broad  homogeneity,  there  was a sharp  disparity
in  their  social  background:  one-third  had  some  university  education,  but  had
not  been  employed  in  a  furniture  craft  position  prior  to  starting  their
business;  541  had  prior  craft  experience,  but  no  university  education.  The
preponderance  of  craft-based  entrepreneurs  highlights  how  important  are
Jepara's  traditional  woodcarving  skills  to  its  emerging  competitive  advantage.
University  education  is  correlated  with  export  performance,  but  is  not
determinate:  50%  of  university-educated  --  but  only  151  of  craft  --
entrepreneurs  exported  at  least  $1  million  of  furniture.  Conversely,  exports
were less  than  $100,000  for  only  25% of  entrepreneurs  with university
education,  and for 541  of craft  entrepreneurs.  As one  astute  participant  in
the industry  put it,  it is  not education  per se,  but "courage  and  openness  --
which  he distinguished  from  the "passivity"  that  he claimed  characterized
traditional  Javanese  society  --  that separated  the  successful  Jeparan
exporters  from  the  rest  of  the  pack.
Six  of  the  sample  firms  were  "pioneers",  initiating  exports  in  1986  or
1967,  and  17 were  "followers",  with  10  of  these  commencing  exports  in  1991  or
later.  The  pioneers  were  a  very  different  breed  of  entrepreneur  than  the
followers:  5  of  the  6  pioneers  --  but only  2  of  17  followers  --  had  university
education; and  all  6  pioneers  --  but only 4 of 17 followers  --  were  no  more16
than 35 years  old  when they commenced  exports,  and  built their  export  efforts
on the foundation  of either  start-up  or relatively  new firms.  But as these
data  imply,  once  the  pioneer  entrepreneurs  had  paved  the  way,  some  ambitious
traditional  participants  followed  in  their  path.
Indonesia's  SME Exporters  of  Garments
Garments  are  the  leading  manufactured  export-from  Indonesia,  with  export
value  expected  to  reach  about  U.S.  5  billion  in  1992.  The  industry  is  highly
concentrated  regionally  and  ethnically.  Ethnically,  it  is  heavily  dominated  by
non-pribumi-  firms,  which  are  estimated  to  have  over  90% of  garment  export
quotas.  Regionally,  production  is  concentrated  in  Jakarta  or  Bandung  and
surrounding  West  Javan  districts.  Of  the  total  -employment  of  126,000,  over
102,000  was  in  the  two  leading  regions.  According  to  an  informal  estimate,  351
of  garment  exports  are  from  Bandung,  typically  from  smaller-medium  firms.
According  to  an  informant,  as  of  1992  there  were  20-30  big  exporters
with,  levels  above  U.S.10  million.  Most  are  self-made  non-pribumi  businessmen,
and  few  have  university  training.  The  smaller  exporters  are  also  mostly  ethnic
Chinese.  A  high  share  of  all  garment  exports  appear  to  come  from  these  small
and  medium-sized-firms.
Growth  has:  been  rapid  in  the  garment  industry  since  the  mid-1970s  --
between  1975  and  198B  value  added  grew  at  an  average  annual  rate  of  391  and
employment  at  27%.  Exports  generated  about  90% of  output  growth  during  the
1980s.  They  expanded  dramatically  from  less  than  $100  million  in  1979,  to
surpass  U.S.l  billion  in  1989,  2^  billion  in 1991 and  about  double  that  a  year
later.17
The  growth  of Indonesia's  garment  industry  was fuelled  by very rapid
entry  of new firms,  some fairly  large  but  most small  and  medium  in size.  As
Table  4 shows,  between 1981  and  1988 the  number  of establishments  registered
with the  Bureau  of Statistics  rose  from 157 to 798,  with the size  composition
changing  somewhat  in  favour  of  the  largest  categories.  In this  relatively
labour  intensive  industry,  however,  the  output  share  of  firms  of  100-999
workers  was  still  65.4%  in  1988,  down  from  73.5%  in  1981.
Field interviews  were conducted  in 1992  with 35  garment  exporters,  27  in
the  Jakarta  area and 8 in Bandung.  Of the 33 firms  reporting  year of founding,
S date from 1968-77,  10 from  the short  interval  1979-82,  3 from 1983-86  and
the  other  14 from 1987-91. Nearly  half of all the  firms  began  with So workers
or less;  at the other  extreme  three  began  with more than 500,  one  of them  back
in 1971,  the  other two in 1985  and 1987;  median  size  at start-up  was 112
workers  and  the mean  was 218 (Table  5).  Median  current  size is 475 workers  and
the  mean  is  1109  so  the  typical  firm  has  grown  4-5  fold  over  a  period  of  about
9  years.  Average  annual  growth  has  been  fastest  for  the  set  of  firms  created
since  the  mid-1980s (about  251  per year).  The reported  level  of sales'ranges
from  under $100,000  to $57  million,  with many firms  falling  in the $1-5 
million  range.
Over  three  quarters  of  the  surveyed  firms  export  all  of  their  output
directly  or  indirectly  (26  of  33),  with  only  1  below  70%.  A  little  under  half
of  the  sampled  firms  began  exporting  in  their  first  year  of  existence;  this
share  was  much  lower  among  the  producers  who  had  their  start  before  the  recent
export  boom.  Of the  8 firms  founded  in the 1970s,  two  began  to  export
immediately;  for  the  others  the  minimum  wait  was  4  years  and  the  median  about
8BlB
Despite  some  effort  to  seek  them  out,  the  sample  includes  only  6  pribumi
firms.  Five  of  the  six  had  started  by  1982  (as  compared  with  10  non-pribumi);
since  that  date  just  one  pribumi  --  versus  14  non-pribumi  --  was  added.
Pribumi  entrepreneurs  have  tended  to  start  considerably  smaller  than  others,
with five of the six starting  with 20 workers or less, and  only one with over
100 (125).  Consequently,  although  their  growth  has been at least average in
percentage terms,  their average  size remains small.
Most  entrepreneurs  were  highly  educated,  with 21 of 31 reporting  at
least some university.  The share  with university  was about the same for
pribumi  and  non-pribumi.  Average  level  was  less  for  those  starting  their  firms
prior  to  1987:  of  these  17  just  8 had  university,  while  among  the  14  most
recent  founders  only  2  had  less  than  university.
5.  EXPORT  MARKETniG  AND ITS  SUPPORT  SYSTEMS
Analysis  of  relative  prices  and  comparative  advantage  are  the  standard
economic  tools  used  to  account  for  export  performance.  Yet  even  with  favorable
.market  conditions,  exports  do  not  proceed  spontaneously,  but  through  the
medium  of  institutions,  and  via  exchanges  which  involve  transactions  costs.
Success  in  new  export  markets  thus requires  the emergence  of transactionally
efficient  export  institutions.  This  subsection  examines  how  the  process  has
taken  place  in  each  of  the  three  subsectors  surveyed.  It  concludes  with  some
observations  on  public  policy  to  strengthen  export  marketing
The  main  findings  are  as  follows:
*  private  channels  --  especially  initiatives  by  foreign  buyers  --
play  a  dominant  role  overall  in  establishing  and  sustaining
linkages  by  SMEs  with  export  markets;  however,  this  role  is  more
important  for  larger  and  non-pribumi  firms and  for  firms  that  have
already  proven  themselves  in  export  markets,  than  for  their
smaller,-pribumi  counterparts  and  for  new  entrants;19
*  linkages  among  an  extended  Chinese  community  that  transcends
national  boundaries  reduce  the transactions  costs  of penetrating
export  markets for  Indonesia's  entrepreneurs  of Chinese  origin vis
a vis their  pribumi  counterparts;
*  collective  marketing  services  supplied  by public  agencies  and
industry  associations  play a useful  role in helping  smaller  and
pribumi firms to build channels  for  export  marketing;  these
services  are valued  by firms  despite the  fact that  there are
significant  limitations  in the quality  of the export  marketing
services  provided  by Indonesia's  collective  institutions.
Export  Marketing in the  Rattan  Furniture  Industry
Tables  6-7  summarize  information  on  patterns  of  export  marketing  by the
surveyed  firms  in  the  rattan  products  industry,  disaggregating  by  stage  in  the'
life  cycle  of  individual  firms,  by  size  of  firm,  and  by  ethnic  background  of
the  entrepreneur.
Overall  patterns  and life-cycle  variations. Private channels  in
general,  and foreign  buyers in  particular,  have played  a  dominant  role in
facilitating  exports  of  rattan  products.  Table  6  details  the  channels  via
which  firms  made  their  initial  export  contacts:  22  of  32  contacts  were  via
private  channels,  with  the  remaining  10  collective.  Table  7  summarizes  average
scores  (on  a  1-5  scale)  given  by  firms  as  to  the  relative  importance  of
different  factors  in facilitating  initial  access  into export  markets;  an
average  score of 1 implies  that all firms  ranked  a given factor  as entirely
unimportant,  an average  of S implies  that all firms ranked  it as most
important.  Identification  by foreign  buyers scores  highest,  with an average
score  of 3.6; more than  half the firms  gave scores  of 4 or 5. Direct  efforts
by firms to contact  foreign  buyers  receive an average score  of 3.5 --  almost
as high as do buyer-inLitiated  contacts,  suggesting  that a substantial  fraction
of orders from foreign  buyers  were actually  the culmination  of supplier
initiatives.  The importance  of direct  initiatives  appears to decline  somewhat20
(the  average score drops to 3.3) as firms  mature. Correspondingly,  the score
for identification  by buyers rises to 4.5 for-the  current  period, suggesting
that the relative importance  of foreign  buyers  actually  grows as firms  mature,
and presumably  build a reputation  in the eyes of buyers.
Variations by size.  As Table 6  shows,  the dominance of foreign buyers
and other private channels  in facilitating  exports is especially  true for
larger  firms:  private channels  accounted for 90%  of initial  export contacts
for firms that started  with more than 100 workers,  but only 501 of contacts
for smaller firms.  This pattern is confirmed in Table 7, where the largest
firms rate identification  by foreign  buyers as much more important for
penetrating export  markets than is support from collective  agencies. By
contrast, support from collective  marketing agencies  is virtually as important
as buyer identification  for the smallest  firms,  with its average score falling
monotonically  from 3.8 for firms  with fewer than 10 workers at start up, to
2.5 for-firms  with over 250  workers.  Direct efforts  by firms  to contact
foreign  buyers also scores  highest C 3.9) for smaller firms (those  with 11-So
employees),  declining  somewhat  as firm size increases.  In sum, contact  with
-foreigners  is not automatic,  but requires  effort: foreign  buyers  tend to seek
out larger  firms, or firms that otherwise  have managed to signal  their
reputation  and availability,  while collective  support in establishing  that
contact is especially  important  for the smallest  firms.
variations by ethnic  backqronnd  of entrepreneur.  variations  in export
marketing channels  between  pribumi and non-pribumi  rattan  exporters go beyond
differences  in firm size.  Many among Indonesia's  Chinese  population are
embedded  in  an  extended  Chinese  community  that  transcends  national  boundaries.
The  data  in  Tables  6  and  7  reveal  that  these  conections  reduce  the21
transactions  costs  of linking  into  export  markets  for  Chinese  via a vis
pribumi  entrepreneurs,  independent  of firm  size.
Among the  firms  with 250 or fewer workers, private channels accounted
for 73% (B  of 11)  of initial  contacts  for  non-pribumi  firms,  but only 46% (6
of 13) for  their  pribumi  counterparts;  the  disparity  is especially  marked  for
the smallest  firms (Table  6). There  is also a significant  difference  between
pribumi  and  non-pribumi  firms  in the  private  channels  used.  While 3-5  of the 6
initial  private  contacts  by pribumis  were  made from inside  Indonesia  (with
buyers  or expatriates  based  inside  the  country,  or by correspondence),  10 of
13 initial  private  non-pribumi  contacts  were  made outside  the  country (via  a
business  trip  abroad,  or a friend  or agent  based  abroad).  These  disparities  do
not  appear  to diminish  as firms  become  established  in export  markets.  Private
channels  account  for  88% of current  contacts  of non-pribumi  firms  with their
three  largest  buyers,  but only  42%  of contacts  for  pribumi.  Even the disparity
within  private channels  widened.  While  pribumi  firms  made 75%  of their  private
contacts  within  Indonesia,  and  only  25% outside,  the  proportions  are reversed
for  non-pribumi  firms  --  67%  outside  Indonesia,  and  only 33% inside.
Lacking  spontaneous  links  to  the  international  marketplace,  pribumi
entrepreneurs  must  rely  on  substitute  mechanisms.  One  such  mechanism  is
subcontracting  --  which  accounted  for  20% of  initial  export  sales  for  pribumi
firms,  but  played  no role for  non-pribumi.  A  second  is  direct  marketing,  which
accounted for 23-26* of pribumi  --  but only SW of non-pribumi  --  exports, both
in the initial  and  current  periods.  Table  7 confirms  these  differences,  with
pribumi  firms  of all size  categories  generally  giving  higher  scores  than  non-
pribumi  to direct  marketing  efforts  and subcontracting  as mechanisms  for
penetrating  export  markets.22
As for collective  mechanisms  to support  participation  in export  markets,
tables  6 and 7 show  that,  even controlling  for size,  collective  mechanisms  are
more widely  used (Table  6),  and are  ascribed  substantially  greater importance
(Table  7) by pribumi  firms  --  both in  initial  export  entry  and  subsequently.
An interesting  variation  on this  pattern  is the firms  which  started  very small
(less  than 10 workers);  in this range  non-pribumi  assigned  just  as much
importance  to the collective  mechanisms  as did  pribumi.
Assistance  to participate  in trade  fairs  abroad  emerges  as by far the
most  useful collective  source  of support,  with an average  score  of 3.8 for
pribumi firms,  well  above trade  fairs  at home  which  received  the  next highest
score  from  pribumi firms  of 2.9;  no other  source.of  marketing  support  emerged
as even moderately  useful (Table  8).  The lead  in promoting  participation  in
trade  fairs  has  been shared  by NAFED (an  arm  of the  Department  of Trade),  by
ASmINDO (the  wood  furniture  industry  association),  and  by  the  semi-autonomous
Export  Suppcrt  Board  which  has provided  financial  support.
Exnort  Marketing  for  Jeparan  Firms
Export  channels:  A firm's  eye view.  Survey  responses  plus other comments
from informants  revealed  that  much of the initial  impetus  in 1986 and 1997 for
exports  of carved  wooden  furniture  came from  private  channels  outside  Jepara:
*  from  visiting  Australians  who stumbled  onto the idea of
combining  Indonesia's  tropical  hardwoods  and  Jepara's  carving
skills  to  produce  reproduction  antique  furniture  for  export
markets;
*  from  Jakarta-based  furniture  producers  who  saw  the  benefits  of
incorporating  hand-carved  features  into  their  furniture  export
efforts;
*'from  tourists  with an interest  in furniture  who happened  to pass
through  Jepara;23
*  and,  from  contacts  in  the  extended  Chinese  community,  both  in
Jakarta  and  beyond.
Table  9  details  the  channels  for  initial  exports  of  the  surveyed  firms.
Table  10  reports  firms'  rankings  of  the  importance  of  each  of  the  various
channels in facilitating exports. Four patterns emerge.
First, as with rattan furniture,  the  process of linking up to foreign
markets  was  predominantly  private:  initial  exports  flowed  through  private
channels  for  19  of  23  firms.  And 15  of  22  firms  scored  the  relative  importance
of  support  by  public  or  non-profit  agencies  at  1,  while  only  5  offered  scores
of 4 or 5.
Second,  among  the  private  actors,  foreign  buyers  and  export  agents
appear  to  provide  the  most  important  export  channel:  this  channel  accounted
for  14  of  23  export  transactions  in  the  initial  period  of  entry,  and  also  for
29  of  46  transactions  in  the  current  period.  As  Table  10  illustrates,
identification  by  buyers  is  ranked  more  highly  by  firms  than  the  other
channels,  both  for  the  initial  and  the  current  periods.  Relative  to  rattan,
there  is  thus  a  greater  preponderance  of  export  channels  where  the  role  of  the
supplying  firm is essentially  a passive one --  perhaps in part a reflection of
the  relatively  lower  levels  of  education  of  the  Jeparan  exporters.
A third pattern, similar to  rattan,  comprises  changes  over  the  life
cycle of firms  in the role of tne various export  channels.  Table  10  provides
modest  evidence  that  the  roles  of  direct  marketing  efforts  by  firms,  of
subcontracting  with  large  exporters,  and  of  support  by  public  or  non-profit
agencies  (again  including  'marketing  through  ASMIN30')  are  larger  during  a
finm's  initial  period  of  entry  into  export  markets  than  during  the  'current'
period,  with  a  correspondingl-y  larger  role  for  foreign  buyers  in  the  'current'24
than  the  initial  period.  These  data  suggest  that  it  can  be  difficult  for  many
new  exporters  and  foreign  buyers  to  work  directly  with  one  another.  What
appears  to  be  required  is  an  agent  capable  of  mediating  between  the  nascent
exporter  and  a.  foreign  buyer.
The  role  of  collective  suoort  services.  The  fourth  pattern  that  emerges
from  Tables  9  and  10  concerns  the  characteristics  of  users  of  collective
support  services.  While  overall  use  was  modest,  as  for  rattan,  collective
services  are  more  highly  valued  by  smaller  firms  with  less  educated
entrepreneurs.  As  is  evident  from  Table  9,  30% of  firms  (3  of  10)  with  total
annual  sales  of less than $250,000  --  but  only 7% of firms (1  of 14)  with
sales of more than that amount --  made their initial exports through
collective  channels.  Correspondingly,  the  average  score  in Table  10 for
support  by  collective  agencies  is highest  for  the  smallest  firms,  then  falls
as  firm  size  increases.  Further,  users  of  collective  support  (in  particular  of
'exports  through  ASMINDO', on  which  more  momentarily)  were  disproportionately
likely  to be craft  rather  than  university-educated  entrepreneurs:  31%  of craft
--b  ut only 141  of university-educated  --  entrepreneurs  used  this channel.
In  all, 13 of the 24 firms  surveyed  took advantage.of  one or more  of
three  kinds  of collective  support  available  to Jeparan  furniture  firms  --
participation  in trade  fairs  held in  Indonesia,  other  support  from  collective
agencies  based  outside  Jepara,  and  export  support  from  the  local  branch  of
ASMINDO.  Assistance  to participate  in trade  fairs  at home  was the  most common
source  of collective  support,  reported  by 10 firms.  However,  the  dominant  view
7 This  pattern  holds  even  as the  industry  matured:  only 3 of 8 1990-2
export  entrants  gave a high score  to "identification  by buyers"  as a channel
of access  into  export  markets.  Indeed,  a majority  of 1990-92  export  entrants
reported  that  visits  by foreign  buyers  resulted  in fewer  than  20% of  their
initial  export  sales.25
among  these  firms  was that  the fairs  did  little  to enhance  access  into  export
markets.
Four of the firms  surveyed  (only  3  provided  specific  information)
utilized  support  from  collective  agencies  outside  Jepara.  One firm  has close
ties  with ASMINDO's  national  office,  which  has  both sent  buyers  to the  firm
and has  helped  it to  participate  in trade  fairs  abroad.  The remaining  two
firms  asked  Indonesia's  national  export  support  agencies  --  none of which  have
made  any  explicit  efforts  to  promote  furniture  exports  from  Jepara  --  to help
identify  prospective  foreign  buyers;  both  firms  followed  up  with
correspondence  to  the  buyers.  For  one  firm,  the  market  contacts  that  resulted
led  to  the  start-up  (in.1990)  of  an  export  business  that  now exceeds  $1
million  annually.  The  other  firm  continues  to  struggle.
Six  firms  reported  that  they  had  exported  'through  ASMNINDO',  the  next
most  common source  of.collective  support;  as  noted  earlier,  these  firms
overwhelmingly  were  small  and  craft-based.  Prima  facie,  the  data  in  Tables  9
and  10  suggest  that  the  local  branch  of  ASMINDO  played  a  crucial  role  in
facilitating  export  access  for  most  of  these  firms.  There  are,  however,  some
troubling  ambiguities  in  ASMIEDO's  role.
The  most  benign  interpretation  is  of  ASMINDO  as  a  provider  of  export
management  services:  handling  export  procedures  for  local  craftspeople  who  are
approached  by  visiting  foreign  buyers,  but  lack  the  knowledge  to  deal  with  the
procedures  themselves,  and  combining  small-lot  orders  into  a  size  large  enough
to  be shipped  by container.  In  providing  these  services,  it could  be argued,
ASMINDO  extends  opportunities  to  firms  that  would  otherwise  be unable  to
participate  in  export  markets.  Indeed,  one  interviewee  commented  that  he  would
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prefer  to export  himself  "but  has  not mastered  the  processn;  a second  wondered
"how  else she  could  know  whether  to take  a buyer  seriously".
A second  interpretation  of  ASMINDO's  role is as an intermediary  between
buyers  and  local  craft  firms,  with  ASMINDO's local  representative  serving  for
many  buyers  as  the  initial  point  of  contact  with  the  local  industry,  and
channelling  them  to  prospective  suppliers.  The  difficulty  here  is  that  the
local  representative  of ASMINDO  is himself  among  the  largest  of Jeparals
furniture  exporters.  Aside from  the  moral  hazards  posed  by an association
representative  being  in  a  position  to  keep  for  himself  the  best  of  the
prospective  buyers,  like  most  large  Jeparan  exporters  the  ASMINDO
representative  makes  extensive  use  of  subcontracting.  Consequently,  it  is
unclear  when  'directing  orders  to  the  firm'  is  a  service  provided  by  the
industry  association  to  its  members,  and  when it  is  an  essentially  private
arrangement  betwe3n  a  contracting  principal  and  its  subcontractor.
Eoort  Marketinct  by  Garment  Firms
Even  more  than  the  other  sectors  studied,  private  channels  dominated
export  linkages  in  the  garment  industry,  with  collective  channels  playing  an
especially  weak  role.  As  noted  earlier,  garments  is  also  the  sector  with  the
most  limited  participation  by  pribumi  firms.  The  combination  of  non-pribumi
dominance  and  the  virtual  absence  of  pribumi  participation  in  the  industry
provides  indirect  support  for  the  proposition  that  linkages  among  an  extended
community  that  transcends  national  boundaries  provides  an  important  way  into
export  markets  for  Indonesia's  entrepreneurs  of  Chinese  origin  vis  a  vis  their
pribumi  counterparts.27
Sunra-national  nrivate  linkaaes. As Tables  11 and  12 show,  among  the
firms  sampled,  over  90% of  export  linkages  came  via  private  channels  --  both
at  entry  and  currently,  and  many  (perhaps  most)  of  the  contacts  took  place
abroad.  Within  the  general  dominance  of private  channels,  identification  by
foreign  buyers  and  agents  ranks  somewhat  higher  than  direct  efforts  by firms,
both initially  and subsequently.  (Table  12)  The  score  for  foreign  buyers  and
agents  rises  as  firms  mature  (a  pattern  observed  also  in  the  other  cases),
further  confirming  the  importance  to  firms  of  building  a  reputation  in  the
eyes  of  foreign  buyers.  The  tables  also  reveal  a  striking  difference  between
non-pribumi  firms  and  the  (small  number  of)  pribumi  firms  in  the  importance
they  ascribe  to  direct  efforts  to  contact  buyers  --  3.6-3.8  for  non-pribumi
firms  as  compared  with  1.2-1.7  for  their  pribumi  counterparts.  A plausible
interpretatia-  of  these  differences  is  that  the  availability  of  connections
abroad  provides  non-pribumi  entrepreneurs  with  a  starting  point  for  their
direct  efforts;  but  lacking  such  connections,  pribumis  perceive  themselves  as
locked  out  of  the  international  marketplace.
Sunbcontracting.  The  field-surveys  uncovered  clear  evidence  that  pribumi
firms,  lacking  the  international  connections  that  were  important  for  the
-export  marketing  efforts  of  non-pribumi  firms,  used  subcontracting  as  a
substitute  channel  of  export  marketing.  Sale  of  the  six  pribumi  in  our  sample
got  started  as  subcontractors,  and  subcontracting  received  the  highest  of  all
average  scores  (3.7)  assigned  by  pribumi  firms  to  the  various  channels  for
entry  into  export  markets  (Table  12).  By  contrast,  only  2  of  28  non-pribumi
firms  got  their  export  start  as  subcontractors,  and  the  average  score  of  2.3
These  differences  remain  when  controlling  for  the  size  of  firm.2B
ascribed  to  subcontracting  in  Table  12  by  non-pribumi  firms  ranked  well  behind
identification  by  buyers  and  direct  efforts  on  the  part  of  the  firm.
Collective  marketina  sunnort.  Collective  channels  account  for less than
10%  of all marketing  contacts  of garment  firms,  both  at entry  and  currently
(Tables  11);  correspondingly,  firms'  evaluation  of support  by public  or  non-
profit  agencies  averages  under  2.2 (Table  12).  So it  is apparent  that,  while
still  somewhat  useful,  collective  marketing  support  is  valued  less in  the
garment  industry  than  in  either  rattan  or  in  the  Jepara  wooden  furniture
industry.  That  said,  as  in  the  other  case  studies  the  smallest  firms  (both
pribumi  and  non-pribumi)  tended  to  value  collective  support  more  highly  than
their  larger  counterparts.9  Unlike  the  other  sectors,  neither  foreign  nor
local  fairs  were  of  much  importance  ---  a  reflection  of  the  reality  that
(unlike  furniture)  the  organized  fair  is  not  an  important  element  of  the
international  garment  marketplace.  For  the  sample  as  a  whole  the  provision  of
information  on  export  marketing  opportunities  was  ranked  highest,  with  the
regionally-based  Bandung  Garment  Exporters  Association  the  most  effective
provider  of  support.
Lessons  for Policy  towards  Exoort  Marketingc
Reflecting  a world-wide  trend,  pro-active  interventions  to facilitate
linkages  with export  markets  by firms  are  very  much  out  of  favor  in  Indonesia.
In  part as a consequence,  the  export  efforts-of  the  Ministry  of Trade  have
been  in  disarray  for  some  time,  and  a  threat  of  closure  hangs  over  the  head  of
the  semi-autonomous  Export  Support  Board.  In  light  of  this  background,  the
9  Average  scores  for  support  from  collective  agencies  were  3.0  for  the
initial  period  of  export  access  for  firms  of  10  or  fewer  workers,  and  were  2.6
for  the  current  period  for  firms  of  50  or  fewer  workers.29
research  results  on  marketing  support  systems  (especially  those  for  rattan
furniture)  are  surprising.
To  be  sure,  the  results  from  all  three  subsectors  reveal  that  private
mechanisms  are  dominant  in  enabling  SMEs to  forge  linkages  to  the
international  marketplace,  and  consequently  that  liberal  policies  alone  can  be
sufficient  for  SME  participation  in  export  markets  to  take  place.  At  the  same
time,  the  surveys  yielded  a  surprisingly  positive  evaluation  of  the  value  of
some  export  marketing  services  provided  by  NAFED, by  the  RSB,  by  the  furniture
industry  association  ASMINDO,  and  (to.a  lesser  extent)  by  the  Bandung  regional
garments  association  --  especially  by  new  entrant  smaller  and  pribumi  firms
which  lack  pre-existing  international  networks  into  which  they  can  tap.
Which  services  are  most  useful?  Within  the  range  of  collective  marketing
services  available,  the  survey  results  suggest  that  aggressive  efforts  to  seek
out  buyers  and  match  them  with  suppliers  do  not  pay  off.  There  was  virtually
no  evidence  that  SMEs reaped  any  benefit  from  the  Ministry.of  Trade's
International  Trade  Promotion  Center  --  an  international  network  of  offices
whose  stated  goal  is  to  provide  international  market  information  and  market
contacts  to  private  Indonesian  firms.  Instead,  firms  valued  services  with  a
,lighter,  touch,  services  where  only  a  modicum  of  support  was  required  to
facilitate  private  to-private  transactions  --  notably  (in  rattan  furniture)
support  for  participation  in  trade  fairs  abroad,  and  (in  Jepara)  quasi-export-
agent  functions  to  facilitate  communications  and  to  navigate  an  unfamiliar
bureaucratic  process.
6.  THE  ACQUISITION  OF  TECmNOLOGICA  CAflfILITY  AND-MTs  SUPPORT  SYSTEMS30
Acquiring  new  capabilities,  and  improving  upon  those  capabilities  that  a
firm  already  has  at its  disposal,  are  crucial  to success  in  export  markets.
Yet  technology  acquisition  poses  substantial  difficulties.  First,  for
information  to  be  useful  it  must  be tailored  to the  specific  needs  of an
individual  industry,  if  not  an  individual  firm.  Second,  uncovering  useful
knowledge  may  require  a  costly  process  of  search,  often  outside  national
boundaries.  Third,  inter-firm  spillovers  of knowledge  are  pervasive.  while
these  spillovers  are  important  channels  of  learnin,,  they  also  create  a
problem  of collective  action,  in  that  a firm  does  not capture  for  itself  all
of the  benefits  of its  investment  in knowledge,  and  hence  may  rationally
underinvest.
The  purpose  of this  section  is to  examine  how technology  acquisition
proceeded  in  each  of  the  three  subsectors,  what  were  the  support  systems  that
facilitated  the  process,  and  what  has  been  --  and  might  be --  the  role  of
government  in relation  to  these  technology  support  systems.  The  main  findings
are  as  follows;
*  Private  channels  have  been  the  dominant  mechanism  for  acquiring
technological  capability  in  all  three  subsectors.
*  Subcontracting  as  a  means  of  organizing  production  is  pervasive
in  all  subsectors,  and  has  been  crucial  to  harnessing  traditional
skills  for  export  production  in  Jepara  in  particular.  While  very
few  firms  have  graduated  from  subcontracting  into  direct  exports,
most  of  those  that  have  rate  their  prior  subcontracting  experience-
as  an  important  mechanism  of  learning.
*  Employment  of  expatriates  emerged  as  an  especially  powerful
mechanism  for-acquiring  technological  capability  in  both  the
rattan  and  garment  sectors.  However,  consistent  with  the
transactional  advantages  of  being  embedded  in  an  extended
community  that  transcends  national  boundaries,  use  of  expatriates
is  concentrated  disproportionately  among  non-pribumi
entrepreneurs.
*  Collective  support  mechanisms  have  played  only  a  limited  role  in
facilitating  technological  upgrading.  As  with  marketing  support31
mechanisms,  they  are  utilized  especially  by  smaller  pribumi  firms,
but  even  for  this  group  their  role  has  been  rmodest.
*  While  the  benefits  of  strengthening  collective  mechanisms  for
technological  upgrading  would  be  substantial,  pervasive
institutional  weaknesses  among  potential  providers  make  the  task  a
difficult  one.
Technological  Capability  and  Sunnort  Systems  in  Rattan  Furniture
When  the  rattan  furniture  export  boom  commenced  in the  late  1980s,
Indonesiats  industry  lacked  both  an accumulated  stock  of experienced
entrepreneurs  and  a  workforce  with  skills  comparable  to  those  of  its  main
international  competitors.  Nonetheless,  considerable  improvement  has  occurred
in  the  quality  of  the  Indonesian  output  over  the  last  5  years  or  so.
This  progress  was  confirmed  by  the  field  surveys.  Firms  were  asked  to
rank  improvements  on  an  increasing  scale  of  "some",  "significant"  and  "major".
virtually  all  of  the  33  firms  surveyed  had  made  at  least  some  improvements  in
both  design  and  in  finishing,  and  about  two  thirds  of  the  firms  reported  some
improvement  in  workplace  organization  and  equipment  sophistication.  In  all
four  categories,  at  least  B firms  reported  significant  or  major  improvements.
While  the  primary  focus  of  this  study  is  on  sources  of  technological
capability  that  are  external  to  firms,  external  providers  are  not  the  only
important  source  of  capability.  Indeed,  as  Table  13 shows,  the  surveyed  firms
rated  on  the  job  learning  as  the  most  important  source  of  capability  over  the
lifetime  of  the  firm.  Support  from  external  providers  does  emerge  as  the  most
important  source  of  capability  for  the  initial  period  of  direct  entry  into
foreign  markets,  although  (for  reasons  examined  in  more  detail  below)  this  is
true  more  for  non-pribumi  than  pribumi  firms.32
Table  14 reports  on the  usefulness  to firms  of 11 external  sources  of
technological  capability.  Seven  of the ll  are  private.
Buyers  and  sunpliers.  overall,  foreign  buyers  emerged  in the survey  as
the  most  useful  source  of technological  capability  for  both pribumi  and  non-
pribumi  entrepreneurs,  with an average  score  of 3.7.  Buyers  share  a strong
mutual  interest  with the  producers  in the  quality  of the  product,  often-
supplying  designs,  and  assisting  the  firms  in finding  the  best  way to produce
their  items.
By contrast  to  foreign  buyers,  equipment  suppliers  are  not an important
source  of capability  (average  score  = 1.6),  partly  due to the simplicity  of
much  of  the  machinery  but also,  according  to  one  informant,  due  to  the
inappropriateness  of  some  of  it  to  the  situation  of  the  small-medium  producer.
Expatriate  emlovees.  The  average  score  for  expatriate  employees  in
Table-14  is  a  modest  2.6.  But  this  average  is  misleading.  Only  14  of  the  33
firms  sampled  used  expatriates,  but  these  14 valued  them  greatly,  with1l-
providing  the  maximum possible  score  of  5,  and  the  remainder  a  score  of  4.
Most  expatriates  came  from  the  Philippines  and  Taiwan  (both  major  rattan
furniture  exporters);  Japan,  the  USA,  Korea  and  Thailand  also  were  suppliers.
Expat  use  is  more  prevalent  for  larger  firms  and  for  those  run  by  non-
pribumi.  Thus,  as  Table  15  shows,  firms  with  over  250  workers  are
substantially  more  likely  to  have  at  least  one  expat  than  their  smaller
counterparts  --  63%  (10  of  16)  as  compared  with  35%  t6  of  17).  Even
controlling  for  firm  size.  Expat  use is concentrated  disproportionately  among
non-pribumi  entrepreneurs  --  63%-  (10  of 16)  use them,  as compared  with only
36% of  pribumi,  with the  intensity  of use three-times  higher  among  the  non-
pribumi  firms.  Half  the  non-pribumi  users.  of expats  recruited  them from Taiwan33
.and  Hong  Kong,  but  none  of  the  pribumi  users  drew  expats  from  these  sources  --
another  pattern  that  points  to  the  transactions  cost  advantages  to  non-pribumi
firms  of  being  embedded  in  an  extended  community  that  transcends  national
boundaries.
Sucontracting. Subcontracting  out  is  the  norm  among  rattan  products
exporters,  with  25  of  the  33  firms  surveyed  principals  in  subcontracting
relations.  Thirteen  firms  subcontract  out  complete  orders,  and  4  of  these
generate  40% or  more  of their  product  for  sale  in this  way. Twenty  firms
subcontract  out  specific  tasks.  Subcontracting  out  is  more  prevalent  among
pribumi  firms,  86% of  whom  (12  of  14)  engage  in  the  practice,  as  compared  with
63t  of the  non-pribumi  (10  of 16).  Further,  pribumi  are  more likely  to
subcontract  out  complete  orders  --  7  do  so (for  an average  of 29%  of sales,  as
compared  with  only  4  non-pribumi.
As part  of their  efforts  to control  product  quality,  the  subcontracting
principals  that  we  surveyed  help  their  subcontractors  build  technological
capability.  In  virtually  all  cases  the  contractor  inspects  the  quality  of
goods  provided  by  the  subcontractor  and  visits  the  plants  to  provide  advice.
In half of the cases  the  firm  also helps  to train  the  workforce,  this  latter
being  a little  less  frequent  among  non-pribumi.  The  median  rejection  ratio  for
the  product  of subcontractors  was Sr.
In  spite  of its  apparent  importance  in the  industry,  subcontracting  does
not  provide  a  major  stepping  stone  into  exports.  Only  4  of  the  firms  surveyed
(all  pribumi)  used  a  relationship  as  a  subcontracting  agent  as  the  channel  for
30% or  more  of  their  initial  exports;  three  of  these-rated  the  relationship  as
important  or  very  important  (score  3-5)  in  breaking  into  export  markets.  None,34
however,  rated  this experience  as useful  as a source  of acquiring
technological  capability.  In sum, the  results  point  to a dualistic  pattern  of
organization  of the  rattan  products  export  industry,  with infrequent
graduation  from status  of  subcontractor  to that  of  principal.
inter-fim linlactes.  Information  from firms  in the same  industry  does
not rank  high as a source  of technological  improvement,  with a modest  average
score  of 1.9 (Table  14).  However,  indirect  transfers  as a result  of movements
of  employees  between  firms  also  appear  quite important:  one-third  of all firms
sampled  gave scores  of 4  or  S to prior  skills  of domestic  employees  as an
important  source  of  technological  capability  for  entry  into  export  markets
(Table  13),  and  reference  by  firms  to  "hi-jacking  of  experienced  workers
confirms  that  a  transfer  is  indeed  occurring.
Literature.  The  average  score  for  technological  literature  also  was
modest  (2.1),  but  pribumi  firms  gave  it  strikingly  more  weight  than  their  non-
pribumi  counterparts  (2.6  versus  1.6  on  average,  with  only  6  of  14  giving  it  a
low  score  of  1  or  2,  versus  13  of  16  non-pribumi).  This  disparity  again  is
suggestive  of  weaker  linkages  among  pribumi  firms  to  the  global  rattan
industry,  and  hence  of  the  importance  for  them  of  substitute  sources  of
-expertise.
Collective  mechanisms.  Table  14 includes  four  collective  mechanisms  for
the aqquisition  of  technological  capability:  support  from  the industry
association  or NGOs; the  foster  father  program;  support  from  public  technology
agencies;  and  (given  that their  use.has  been subsidized by government or the
- *  industry  association  for  7  of  9 interviewees)  support  for  private  consultants.
As the table  shows,  the  role  of these  collective  mechanisms  in  upgrading  has
been modest  overall,  and  virtually  irrelevant  for  non-pribumis.  The industry35
association  or NGOO  were of some  significance  for  pribumi,  with  an average
score  of 2.1 and  a rating  of 4  or 5 from  three  firms.  Public  support  agencies
were cited  positively  by just  three  pribumi  firms,  in two  cases  with a rating
of 4. Private  consultants  are used  by just  9 firms,  being  given  a 4-5  rating
by 4; 24 did  not use them  at all.  The  foster  father  plan was relevant  to only
one  pribumi  firm,  but was  viewed  as important  by that  firm.  A fifth  mechanism
of  collective  support  (not  included  explicitly  in Table  14)  comprises  courses
to improve  the skills  of both  workers  and  managers.  Fifteen  firms  reported
that  personnel  had  participated  in such  courses;  8  mentions  were of furniture
making,  3  of  management  and  the  rest  a  small  miscellany  of  others.  10  of  13
(which  provided  this  datum)  were  sponsored  by  a  public  organization.
Table  16 details  the  use of-all  forms  of collective  support (including
courses  and  financial  support  to  hire  private  consultants),  disaggregated  by
start-up  size  of  firm  and  ethnic  background  of  the  entrepreneur.  Over  two-
thirds  of  all  firms (and  nearly  all  of  the  pribumi  --  12  of  14)  had  utilized
some form  of support  and  nearly  half  had  assigned  a score  of 3 or more to at
least  one  of four  sources.  Only small  non-pribumi  firms  failed  to utilize  and
value  at least  some source  of support.  Thus,  viewed  together,  the set  of
collective  support  mechanisms  are  not  insignificant.  But  they  are  much  less
important  than  the  private  channels.
Technological  aabilitv  and  Sunort  Svtems  in  Jenara
Jepara's  move  into  export  markets  has  been  built  upon  the  sturdy
foundation  of  a  long  tradition  of  high  quality  carving  and  woodworking
craftsmanship.  Over  generations,  these  skills  have  been  refined  and
transmitted  among  families,  neighbors,  teams  of  co-workers.  Detailed  analysis36
of the  workings  of this  rich system  of informal  apprenticeship  --  is  beyond
the  scope  of the  present  study.  Rather,  the focus  here is  on the  ways in which
Jepara's  furniture  firms  have  adapted  to the  needs  of export  markets.
Production  of wood furniture  for  export  is far  more demanding  than
production  for  the  domestic  market.  Not only  is export  demand  very difierent
in both  design  and finish  than domestic  demand,  foreign  buyers  also typically
require  higher  quality  furniture  construction,  pre-treatment  via  kiln drying
of wood to  ensure  that  furniture  does  not  warp  or  crack  in countries  that are
less  humid  than Indonesia,  and reliable  delivery  according  to pre-specified
schedules.
fubcontrating. Factory  production  is one  way  of organizing  to maintain
control  over  production  and  scheduling.  However,  Jepara's  furniture  industry
has long been organized  via  a series  of loose  contracting  arrangements  between
individual  craftspeople  and  the co-ordinators  of subcontracting  teams;  and
between  contractors  and  groups  of subcontractors.  The challenge  for  new
exporters  was  to  reshape  these  traditional  contracting  arrangements  in  a  way
that  was  acceptable  to  craft  workers,  yet  also  was  able  to  secure  the
requisite  quality  and reliability.
Table  17  reveals  how  the  successful  exporters  (with  one  exception,  the
largest  firms  in  the  sample)  responded  to this  challenge:  retain
subcontracting,  but  move  from  loose  to  exclusive  arrangements,  with
subcontracting  agents  agreeing  to  work  for  one  principal  only  in  return  for  an
ongoing  flow  of  orders;  and  --  for  some  firms  --  maintain  substantial  in-house
production  capability  both  as  a  means  of  demonstrating  and  maintaining  quality
control,  and  as  a  seed-bed  for  spinning-off  new  subcontractors.37
The 9 larger exporters  that provided  information use a variety of
mechanisms  to ensure that subcontractors  provide the requisite quality  and
reliability:  All maintain  staff in-house to monitor  the quality of goods
delivered,  and all reported rejecting and requiring repairs on some fraction
(ranging from 2% to 10%) of deliveries.  Some work only with subcontractors  who
are close associate-  or former employees.  And some reported visiting  each
subcontractor  on at least a weekly basis to provide advice; and some reported
that they helped to train the workforce  of their jubcontractors.'° 0
Private mechanisms  for acauirinc technolojical  capability.  Foreign
buyers have been the most common source of support for upgrading  technology  to
meet  export standards with 78% of firms  (18  of 23 in Table 18) reporting  that
they receired such support, and a majority  of these indicating that they
valued  this support highly: 9 firms assigned the maximum possible.score  of 5.
Buyers were  especially  important in transmitting  information relevant  to
design and finishing  (see  Table 19)  -
Foreign  buyers aside, eight other non-collective  mechanisms  for
acquisition  of  technological  capability  are  included  in  Table  18.  Information
from  technical  literature  and  support  from materials  suppliers were both  'nuite
widely cited  --  by 50% and 48% of respondents  respectively  --  with the former
most important  in learning about design, and the latter  (notably courses
offered by paint and varnish suppliers)  especially  important in efforts  to
upgrade  finishing. However neither scored especially high as an.important
'I  10 firms that export less than $250,000 also provided  information  on
their relations  with their-subcontractors.  2 reported that they both visit
their subconitractors  at least teeeV-lv  yr  -ronr`.-  scr"n  tr_hning  to the
workforce;  4 that they visit with some regularity  (ranging from 3-times per
week to  'when needed')  but do not provide  training; 2 that they help  train but
rarely visit;  and 2 that they neither  train nor visit.38
source  of capability.  Although  two local  inter-firm  mechanisms  of learning
proved  useful, forty  five  percent  of respondents  reported  learning  from
similar  firms  within  Jepara,  with  modest  gains;" and support  from
subcontracting  principals  was cited  by 6 firms,  and ranked  high by the 5 firms
that  provided  scores.  Four final  private  mechanisms  of learning  --  from joint
venture  partners, from  private  consultants,  from local  buvers  and from
expatriate  employees  --  were not identified  as useful.
Collective  mechanisma.  The  aggregate  data in Table  18 suggest  that
collective  mechanisms  have  played  only a modest  role in the acquisition  of
technological  capability:  43% of respondents  acknowledged  support  from  ASMINDO
or other  non-governmental  organizations,  and 26% from  government  agencies;
however,  their usefulness  scores  were modest.  Yet for  all that its  role is-
limited  in aggregate,  the field  evidence  provides  some support  for  rhe
hypothesis  that collective  technology  support  fills  gaps that would otherwise
be left uncovered  by private  actors.
The field survey  uncovered  evidence  that collective  efforts  to support
technology  acquisttion  reach  firms  that  would  not  otherwise  be  able  to
participate  effectively  in  export  markets.  69%  (9  of  13) of  craft  --  but  only
36%  (4 of  11)  of  university-educated  --- entrepreneurs  reported  that  they  had
indeed  availed  themselves  of  collective  technological  support.  A  similar
pattern  is  evident  among  the  threel 2 firms  that  gave  scores  of  4  or  S  in  Table
"  These  moderate  scores  appear  suspiciously  low,  and  may  reflect  an
unwillingness  on  the  part  of  interviewees  to  acknowledge  ubiquitous  imitation.
Alternatively,  they  may  signal  that  the  export  market  is  still  at  an  early
stage  of  development,  and.has  not  yet  sunk  deep  roots  in  Jepara.
12  One  firm scored  4  for  one  category  and  5  for  the  other.  One  of  the  2
entrepreneurs  that  scored  3  for  the  NGO/industry  association  category  was
university  educated,  but  the  other  had  only  primary  education.39
28 to collective  support  mechanisms:  none were university  educated (though  two
had completed secopdary  school);  all 3  were craft-entrepreneurs;  none were
industry  pioneers.
A second  gap-filling  role is related to function.  While some areas
appear  well covered  by private mechanisms,  collective  agencies, (e.g.  NGOs, a
local  woodworking  school,  and  the  industry  association  ASNINDO) were  important
channels  of  information  on  how  to  dry  wood  to  prevent  warping  or  cracking,  and
on  how to finish furniture  to secure  the 'look'  preferred  on export  markets
(Table  19).
Aenuisitio  ofTcnolocrical  Canability  andBuor  S.ystems  for  Garment
While Indonesia's  garment industry  presently  competes  on  the  lower  end
of  the  quality  spectrum,  it  is  frequently  argued  that  it needs to begin to
move upmarket  into garments  with greater  fashion  content  and  more
sophisticated  design,  and  with  the associated  shorter  turnaround  time.
The  field  survey  confirmed  that  considerable  technological  improvement  has
-indeed  been  occurring.  Fourteen  of  31  firms  -indicated  that  they  have  made
.significant  or  major  design  improvements,  with  pribumi  and  non-pribumi  not
differing  much  in  this  regard.  Seventeen  of  31  claimed  significant  or  major
improvements  in  workplace  organization.  Nine  firms  cited  significant  or  major
improvements  in  equipment  sophistication.
As  with  rattan,  on  the  job  learning  emerges  as the  most  important  source
of  capability  over the lifetime  of garment firms (Table  20). One striking
feature of the  garment case is the negligible  role of collective  support
provision.  Whereas in  rattan  collective  support  played  some,  albeit  modest40
role in upgrading capabilities,  in garments  it played  virtually none (Table
21).  Note, though,  that the absence  of useful collective  support  may not be
for  want of trying. Indonesia's  garment  and textile  industries  have a long
history of public interventions  to build technological  capability.  Bandung's
Institute  of Textile  Technology  is 60 years old.
Turning to private channels,  Table 21 details firm rankings  of various
sources of support.  Some striking  parallels  with rattan  and wood furniture
emerge, but also some intriguing  differences.
Expatriate  emploees.  As with rattan,  about half of the firms sampled
used expatriates,  and virtually all that did rated  their value exceedingly
highly.  Expatriates  were  viewed  as  especially  useful  with  respect  to  efforts
to improve organization  of the workplace.
Use of expats  was again concentrated  among the larger (and  hence non-
pribumi firms);  none of the firms  with 100 or fewer  --  but all of those with
more  than 1000  --  workers  used expats (Table  22). Only 1 pribumi firm used
expats  (from  Korea),  and  the  intensity  of  its  expat  use  was  lower  than  for
non-pribumi  firms in  the  same  size  category.  Twenty  of  26  non-pribumi  used
expats,  with the dominant  countries  of origin  being Korea and Hong Kong.
Again, it is evident that the non-pribumi  are well placed to draw effectively
on the technological  expertise  of the regional  Chinese community.
Age of the firm is another determinant  of the use of expats.  Among those
size categories  where use is prevalent,  firms founded  before 1987 tend to use
less than half as  many expats  per worker  as  the  more  recently  established
ones. Very possibly, this pattern  reflects  a learning  process whereby the
expats are replaced  as a firm's  workers  develop  the necessary  skills.41
Ru=rs  and sunnliers.  Foreign  buyers  again emerged  as an important
source  of technological  capability,  although  not to the same  extent observed
in the other sectors (average  score =  3.0).
Equipment  suppliers  scored  somewhat  higher  for garments (average  =  2.1)
than  they  did  for rattan,  with firms  that reported  significant  or major
improvements  in equipment  sophistication  making particular  mention of the
information  provided  by suppliers.  Their  average score  was a full point higher
for  pribumi than non-pribumi  firms (3.0  versus 1.9),  perhaps yet another
signal  of the importance  pribumis  ascribe  to sources  of expertise  that can
substitute  for  their  weaker  international  connections.
Subcontracting.  As  in  both  rattan  and  wooden  furniture,  the  survey
uncovered  a  substantial  amount  of  subcontracting  among  garment  firms.  Twenty
of  33 firms reported  subcontracting  out some share  of their orders,  with the
median share  produced  in this way being 20%. While whole-order  subcontracting
is widely  prevalent,  subcontracting  is used only to a moderate  degree to
achieve specialization  and a greater division  of labor.3 The  most  common  ways
of  finding  subcontractors (26  firms  reported  on this)  was through  business
word of mouth (9)  active  search-(6),  their coming  to the firm (5)  and the firm
training  individuals  to take on the role (4),r  two firms reported  that their
subcontractors  had previously  been employees.  In virtually  all cases the
contractor  inspected  the  quality  of goods  provided  by the subcontractor  and
visited  the  plants  to  provide  advice;  in  half  of  the  cases  the  firm  also
helped  to  train  the  workforce.
13  Countries  differ  in  the  extent  of  division  of-labor.  The  pattern  of
producing  a  whole  garment  within  a  factory  has  long  been  the  norm  in  Korea.
But  much  more  specialization  is  evident  among  Taiwanese  and  Hong  Kong  firms.42
There is somewhat  more evidence for the garment industry  than for rattan
that subcontractilg  has served  as a stepping.stone  into direct exports,
especially  for pribumi firms:  five of the 6 pribumi informants  gave a score of
3 or higher  to their subcontractor  principals  as a useful  source of technical
support (see  Table 21). The divergent  patterns  for garments  and rattan  suggest
that the possibility  of graduating  from subcontractor  to direct exporter  may
rise somewhat  as an industry  matures.
Other inter-firm  linkages.  An especially  striking  difference  between the
garment  and  rattan  case  studies  is  in  the  greater  importance  to  the garment
industry  of  inter-firm  spillovers  (other  than  subcontracting).  A comparison  of
Tables  13.and  20 provides one  piece of evidence:  the average score  given to
prior skills  of domestic  employees  as source  of technological  capability  in
.the  initial  period  of  entry  into foreign  markets is 3.5 for the  garment
industry  (with  over  50% of  firms  volunteering  a  score  of  4  or  5),  as  compared
with 2.7 for  rattan (where  one-third  of firms scored  4  or  5).  A second  piece
of evidence  lies in the substantial  difference  in the importance  accorded  to
learning  from  other  firms  in  similar  activities,  a source  given an average
score  of  3.8  by  the  garment  firms,  but  only  1.7  by  those  in  the  rattan
industry  (compare  Tables  14  and  21).  Again,  a  plausible.interpretation  of
these  differences  is  that  the  magnitude  of  intra-industry,  inter-firm
spillovers  rises as an industry  matures.
The Delivery of Collective  Technical Supoort  in Indonesia
The  case  studies  of  rattan  furniture,  carved  wooden  furniture  from
Jepara,  and  garments  suggest  that  there  may  indeed  be  gaps in technological
support systems  which could in  principle  be  filled  by  collective  institutions,43
but that Indonesia's  collective  institutions  largely  lack the  capability  to
fill these  gaps and that  remedying  these  weaknesses  is likely  to be difficult.
The  survey  results  suggest  that neither  of the two  major technology-
related  initiatives  under the  umbrella  of  the  Ministry  of  Industry  --  the
Ministry's  extensive  network  of  technology  extension  services,  and  its  foster
father  program  --  have  been  of  significant  benefit  to  SME exporters.  It  is
possible  that  this  negative  result  is  an  artifact  of  the  survey's  exclusive
focus  on  exporters,  and  that  more  substantial  benefits  might  be  evident  among
firms  that  serve  only  the  domestic  market.  However,  there  are  reasons  for
suspecting  that  the  failures  may  be  more  fundamental.  As  is  evident  from  the
case  studies,  a firm's  technological  needs are  highly  specific  to its
individual  circumstances  --  and specific  needs  of this  kind simply  cannot  be
met by a centrally-controlled,  supply-driven  network  of technology  extension
services  staffed  by personnel  whose  specialized  technological  expertise  is  at
best modest.  As for subcontracting  (which  the foster  father  program  is geared
to  promote),  the  field  surveys  reveal  that  it  already  is  pervasive,  and  that
it  has  emerged  spontaneously  in  response  to  its  organizational  and  commercial
advantages-  There  may  be some room on the  margin  for tilting  incentives  in
such  a  way  as  to  accelerate  the  emergence  of  subcontracting.  However,  a
program  which  pays no attention  to the  underlying  economic  incentives  of  firms
to  participate  in  subcontracting  arrangements  is  doomed  to  have  no  independent
impact.
In  principle  industry  associations  might  be  better  placed  than  a
centralized  ministry  to  collectively  provide  industry-specific  knowledge.
Indeed  in  both rattan  and garments,  industry  associations  provided  useful
technical  or marketing  support.-  However,  overall  Indonesia's  industry44
associations  tend to be exceedingly  weak.  They are  not professionally  staffed;
they are rarely  accountable  to  their  members;  they tend to be captured  by
powerful  players/patrons  in the industry,  and consequently  are  viewed  with
ambivalent  suspicion  by smaller  participants  in the industry;  and their
umbrella  organization  lacks  credible  autonomy  from  government.
Overall,  the  message  of the case studies  with respect  to SME technology
policy is  a mixed one.  On the  positive  side,  the  evidence  is clear  that
private  channels  alone  have  been  adequate  to  permit  a  substantial  amount  of
technological  upgrading  to  occur.  The  implication  follows  that  it  is  important
for  Indonesia  to  sustain  and  strengthen  liberal  policies  towards  the
international  flow of people  and  information.  But  on  the  negative  side,  the
evidence  suggests  that,  while there  clearly  are technology  gaps which in
principle  could  be filled  by collective  institutions,  at best the  development
of Indonesia's  collective  technology  support  system  is in its infancy.  A
central  lesson  of the experience  thus far is that at this stage  of Indonesia's
development  the  government  should  not be in the  business  of direct  delivery  of
technology  services.  Rather,  its  role  should  be  to facilitate  and support  the
emergence  of private  networks  of technology  provision-  Some  potentially
successful  measures  to support  the  acquisition  of technological  capability
include  subsidization  of  the  use  of  foreign  private  technical  consultants;  and
some  specialized  training  offered  by non-governmental  oganizations.  What these
initiatives  have in common  is the use  of concessional  funding  channeled  by
agencies  organized  along  lines  similar  to the export  support  board  to support
non-government  service  delivery.
7.  CONCLUSIONS45
Five general  conclusions  as to the  appropriate  balance  between  private
and  collective  technical  and marketing  support  systems  for Indonesia's  SME
exporters  emerge  from  the empirical  research.
First,  private  support  systems  alone  have been sufficient  to sustain  a
substantial  fraction  of Indonesia's  SME  exports. Most export  marketing  has
taken  place  exclusively  through  private  channels  and  private  channels  have
been  the  dominant  source  of  technological  capability  for  SME exporters.  The
implication  follows  that  it  is  important  for  Indonesia  to  sustain  and
strengthen  liberal  policies  towards  the  international  flow  of  people  and
information.
Second,  access  to  these  low  transactions  cost  private  channels  of
support  appears  to  be  uneven.  Private  channels  appear  to  be  most  readily
accessible  to  larger  firms,  to  educated  entrepreneurs  and  to  non-pribumi
entrepreneurs  who  can  take  advantage  of  a  network  of  linkages  among  an
extended  Chinese  community  that  transcends  national  boundaries.  While
extensive  subcontracting  takes  place  between  larger  and  smaller  firms,  so  far
there  is  only  limited  evidence  of  subcontractors  graduating  to  become  fully-
fledged  exporters.  In all,  an  exclusive  reliance  on  private  support  systems
risks  limiting  the  participation  in export  markets  of a broad  base of SME
entrepreneurs.
Third,  collective  support  can  substitute  for  a  lack  of  access  to  private
channels  on  the  part  of  "cutsider"  private  firms.  Pribumi  and  smaller  firms
relied  heavily  on  collective  marketing  support  to gain access  to export
markets.  And  collective  technology  support  appeared  somewhat  more  important
for  smaller,  pribumi  firms,  although  even  for  this  group  its  impact  has  been
modest.46
Fourth,  pervasive  organizational  weaknesses  sharply  limit  the  potential
of Indonesia's  collective  institutions  to aid in broadening  the  base of
private  entrepreneurship.  Public  institutions  generally  lack the commitment
resources  and flexibility  to provide  high-quality  support  to SMEs.  And
industry  associations  generally  lack  the  professionalism  and accountability  to
win the confidence  of putative  private  recipients  of their  services.
Fifth,  at this stage  in Indonesia's  development,  pro-active  intervention
to broaden  private  participation  in export-oriented  industrial  development
should  support  private-to-private  transactions,  and  not endeavor  to provide
support  directly.  Direct  efforts  by the  public  bureaucracy  to find  foreign
buyers  for  Indonesian  firms  and  direct  efforts  to  upgrade  technological
capability  both  appear  to  have  been  failures.47
TABLE I
THE AVERAGE  DISTRIBUTION  OF INDUSTRIAL  EMPLOYMENT
BY ESTABLISHMENT  SIZE  AND BY LEVEL  OF PER CAPITA  INCOME
(% OF TOTAL)
GNP  Per  Number  of  Cottage  Smail  Medium  Large  Total
Capita ($)  Cournries  Shops  (5-19)  (20-99)  (100 +)
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ~~(1-4)_  _  _  _  _  __  _
.$100-500  6  64  7  4  25  100
|$50  ,000  7  41  12  10  37  100
$1,000-2000  7  1  1  13  14  61  100
$2,000-5,000  9  8  11  17  64  100
1$5,000  +  5  4  6  20  70  100
Source: Donald  E Snodgrass,  "Employment  and-  Enterprise  Policy  in Structual  Transformation,"
Harvard  Insitte  of Intemational  Development,  draft manuscript,  July 1992,  page 63.
Notes: Based  on industrial  data  from 34 countries.48
TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION  OF SAMPLED RATTAN  FIRMS,
BY START-UP  AND CURRENT  SIZE
.... ~~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~~  . . . ---  _  .__
Mean Inifial  Current  Size
Current  Size (Number  of Workers)  Al  Size  Mean (Number.
Size  at Start-Up  (Number  of  of Workers)
1-50  51.100  101-  251-  501-  >1000  Workers)
250  1500  goo9  I  __,_  _
010  Workers
All  1  1  2  3  0  0  7  5.7  270
Pribumi  1  1  2  4  5.5  295
Non-pribumni  1  1  1  3  6  237
11-50  Workers
All  2  3  2  2  0  10  31.5  250
Pribumi  1  0  2  2  2  0  7  29  *  311.
Non-pribumi  0  2  0  0  0  0  2  40  68
100-250 Workers
All-  2  0  3  1  4  0  9  151  37S
Pribumi  1  0  2  0  0  0  3  144  130
Non-pribumi  0  0  1  1  3  0  5  145  4,70  .
251-500 Workers
All  0  0  1  1  2  1  5  350  680
Pribumi  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Non-pribumi  0  0  1  1  3  0  5  145  470
>500 Workers
All  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  600  900
Pribumi
Non-pribumi  600  900
All
All  3  5  9  6  9  1  32  136  377
Pribumi  3  1  5  3  2  0  14  67  234
Non-pribumi  0  4  2  3  5  1  15  191  481
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TABLE  3
PARTICIPATION  IN EXPORT  MARKETS
BY  SURVEYED  JEPARA  FIRMS
Annual  Value  Total
of  Export  as Percentage  of Firm  Sales  Number  of
Export  Sales  <50%  50-74% [  799%  |  00%  Firms
US $1 million or more  - 2  2  3  7
US $600,000-999,999  - 3  3
US $250,000-599,999  - -
US $100,000-249,999  - - 3  1  4
.US Less  than  $100,000  5  3  1  1  10
Total  Number  of  Firms  5  5  9  2450
TABLE  4
SIZE STRUCTURE  OF  THE GARMENT  INDUSTRY,  1981.89'
Slze of Establishment (Number  of Workers)




1981  55.4  19.1  19.1  51.0  1.3  100.0  157b
1985  . 74.0  15.8  17.4  3.3  1.7  100.0  5 7 5 b
1988  61.8  13.2  18.9  18.8  18.8  100.0
Distribution of
Output:
1g81  11.6  10.8  36.6  28.9  12.2  100.0  16.40
1985  11.7  10.0  46.5  17.7  14.0  100.0  121.60
1987  13.3  6.7  33.8  31.0  18.9  100.0  333.50
1989  7.2  6.0  39.6  29.5  17.7  100.0  446.20
Distrfbution of
Employees:
1981  11.4  10.4  41.7  26.2  10.3  100.0  20.2d
1985  17.4  8.9  33.7  18.9  21.2  100.0  69.7"
1987  13.3  6.7  33.3  22.6  24.2  100.0  107.Sd
1966  11.0  6.4  32.6  27.0  -22.9  100.0
Source:  Unpublished  data  of BPS,  based  on  the  annual  manuhcturing  survey.
* Thee data  ae highly  inoomplete  wifth  respect  to the  smallest  size  category.  The  number  of establishments  in large
catoegories  that  may  be missed  is not  clear,  but it is probably  not  too many.
b Valu-added  at mwket  prices,  billion  rupiah.
Number  of establishments.
aNumber  of employee.,  thousands.51
TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION  OF SAMPLED GARMENT  FIRMS,
BY START-UP  AND CURRENT  SIZE
*Ske  at  - Current  Size  (Number  of Workers)  Mean  Mean
Start-Up  . Start  Current
(Workers  I1-  100  101-250 | 251-500|  500-999  T  1looo  -AI  I  Size  |Sze
0-10  2  2  2  2  0  0  8  4s  107
l  _______  (2P)'  (2P)  (1P)'  . . .
11-50  1  0  4  1  0  1  7  36.4  431.
._  __*_  (  1P  )  a  .__  _ _  _  _  .__  _  _ _  _  ._  _  _  .
|100-250b  0  0  lb  6  0  3  10  187  1185
251-500  0  0  0  1  3  2  6  391  1217
>500  0  0  0  0  0  3  3  967  4733
All  3  2  7  10  3  8  34  218  1109
Notes:
Figure3  in parentheses  refer  to pribumi  Irms..
b This category includes one fimT.  -hich  began with  70 workers.  - - :52
TABLE 6
CHANNEL FOR FIRST DIRECT EXPORTS,  BY INITIAL SIZE OF
RATTAN  FIRM AND ETHNIC GROUP
Initial  Size  (Number  of Workers)  .
Channel  ,
1-50  51-100  101-250  >250  All
Collective:
Fair  Outside  r  3  3
Indonesia  Ph  2  2
NPC  I  1
Fair Inside  T  1  31  1 
Indonesia  p  1  1  2
NP  1  t
NAFED  T  2  2  4
P  2  2  3
NP  1  1
All Colective  T  6  3  1  10
P  4  2  1  7.
NP  2  1  0  3
Private:
.luyer of Foreign  T  1  2  2  5
Agent  in Indonesia  p  1  1  2
NP  1  1  1  3
Buyer/Business  T  2  2  3  7
Tour/Correspon-  P  1  1
dence Outside  NP  1  2  6
Family  or Friends  T  1  2  3  7
P  1  1
NP  1  2  3  6
Business  Contract/  T  3  3
Partner  P  2  2
NP  1  1
Unspecified  T  1  1
P  1-  1
NP
All Private  T  1  9  6  6  22
P  6  1  7
NP  2  2  4  5  13
Total  T  7  11  8  6  32
P  4  7  3  0  14





RELATIVE  IMPORTANCE  OF PUBLIC  SUPPORT  AND OTHEa FACTORS
IN INITIAL  AND CURRENT  ACCESS  TO RATTAN  EX?ORT  MARKETS,
BY START-UP  SIZE  AND BY ETHNIC  GROUP
Inital Access
actor  Contributing  to Access  Current
Export  Markets  Size at Start-Up  (Number  of Workers)  Access
cO  11-50  100-250  >250  All  Ail
lentificatior  of
rm  by foreign  To  3.8  .3.2  3.7  4.0  3.6  4.3
uyers  or export  Pb  3.0  2.9  3.7  3.1  4.1
gents  NPC  4.5  4.5  3.8  4.0  4.2  4.5
lirect  efforts  by the
rm  to contact  foreign  T  2.9  3.9  3.6  3.7  3.5  3.3
uyers  or export  P  3.3  4.0  3.3  3.6  3.6
gents  NP  2.5  3.0  3.4  3.4  3.1  2.8
;upport  by public  or  T  3.8  2.9  2.8  2.5  3.1  2.9
onprofit  agencies  P  3.8  3.3-  3.0  3.6  3.3
NP  3.8  1.5  2.4  2.8  2.8  2.9
;ubcontracting  T  1.5  1.0  1.7  1.0  1.3  1.1
alationship  with  P  1.8  1.0  3.0  1.6  1.1





RELATIVE  USEFULNESS  TO RATTAN  FIRMS OF  VARIOUS  TYPES  OF
SUPPORT  FROM  PUBLIC  AND OTHER  NONPROFIT  AGENCIES
IN PENETRATING  EXPORT  MARKETS
Type of Support  Firm  Size  at Start-Up  (Number  of Workers)
<10  11-50  100-250  251-500  >500  All
Facilitated  r  4.0  3.2  2.9  1.0  3.0  3.0
Participation  in  pb  5.0  3.1  3.7  - - 3.8
Trade Fairs  Abroad  NPC  3.0  3.0  2.2  1.0  3.0  2.3
Organized  a Fair  at  T  2.8  3.4  2.7  1.8  1.0  2.7
Home  p  2.3  2.9  4.0  0  - 2.9
NP  3.3  4.5  2.0  2.0  1.0-  2.6
Sent  Buyers  to the  T  2.1  2.0  2.0  1.4  1.0  1.9
Firm  -p  2.8  2.1  1.7  - 2.2
NP  1.5  1.0  2.4  1.5  1.0  1.7
Supported  T  2.0  2.3  1.8  1.0  2.0  1.9
Marketing  or  P  1.8  2.4  2.0  - - 2.1
Exploratory  Trips  NP  2.3  1.0  1.8  1.0  2.0  1.6
Abroad
Information  on  T  2.1  2.6  1.7  1.6  2.0  1.9
Export  Market  P  2.0  2.3  2.0  - - 2.1-





CHANNEL  FOR  FIRST  DIRECT  EXPORTS  OF  JEPARA  FIRMS,
BY CURRENT  SIZE  OF FIRM
Size  of Firms  (Total  Current  Sales,  $000's)
. l  Channel  <100  100-249  251-999  >1000  All
Collective:  I  _  _
Asmindo  1  2  1  4
-Private:
Buyer  in Indonesia  3  4  5  2  14
Expatrate/Family  2  2
Partner
Correspondence  2  2
Agent  or Buyer  1  1
Abroad
TotaI  Private  3  4  5  7  19
i  Total  I1  I4  6  5  _  8  2356
TABLE  10
RELATIVE  IMPORTANCE  OF  DIFFERENT  FACTORS  IN THE
FACILITATION  OF  ACCESS  TO JEPARA  EXPORT  MARKETS,
BY  CURRENT  SIZE
Initial  Access
Average  Percent  of  Curent
Importance  Firms  Access
Score  Assigning  a
Score  of
Factors  Size  4 - 5
Direct  Efforts  by Firm  to  T  1.8  0.0  18.2  1.3
Contact  Foreign  Buyers  <100  1.0  0.0  0.0
or Export  Agents  100-249  1.4  0.0  0.0
250-1000  1.8  0.0  20.0
>1000  2.7  0.0  42.0
Identification  of Firm  by  T  3.4  0.0  50.0  4.7
Foreign  Buyers  or  <100  3.4  0.0  60.0
Export  Agents  100-249  3.4  0.0  60.0
250-1000  3.8  0.0  60.0
>1000  3.1  28.6  28.6
Support  by Public  or  T  2.0  4.5  18.2  1.7
Nonprofit  Agencies  <100  2.6  0.0  40.0
100-249  2.2  0.0  20.0
250-1000  1.4  0.0  0.0
>1000  2.0  14.3  14.3
Subcontracting  T  2.4  5.3  26.3  1.9
Relationship  with Larger  <100  1.0  0.0  0.0
Exporters  100-249  2.8  0.0  40.0
250-1000  -2.5  0.0  25.0
>1000  3.0  16.7  33.3
Notes:
* Size equals total sales  (US $000's).57
TABLE  11
CHANNEL  FOR  FIRST  DIRECT  EXPORTS  BY  START-UP  SIZE  AND
ETHNIC  GROUP,  GARMENT  FIRMSE
Number  of Workers  --
Con|1-10  11-50  | 1 0 0-2 5 0 b  J  251-500  >500  All
Private:
Buyer  in Indoneisa/Foreign  1  (P)  2  2  1  6
Agent in  Indonesa/Buyer  Caime
Family/Friends  2  2
Buyer  Outside  Indonesia  1  2  1  1  5
Business  Tour  Abroad  1  1  1  3
Business  Contactt  0  2  1  2  0  5
Partner/BusinesslWord  of Mouth
Subcontract  2(P)  0  2  1  0  2
Contacted  Buyer/Agent  0  2(1EP)  0  0  0  2
CollectEve:  11  2
Fair  Outside  Indonesia
NAFED-  1  O  O  - O  1
[Unspecified  2(1  P)  0  0  0  0 
Total  - 8  7  10  6  3  34
Notes:
aP  refers  to Pribumi  firms.
bIncludes  one  firm  which  started  with  70 workers.58
TABLE  12
RELATIVE  IMPORTANCE  OF DIFFERENT  FACTORS  IN THE
FACILITATION  OF INITIAL  AND CURRENT  ACCESS
TO GARMENT  EXPORT  MARKETS,
BY START-UP  SIZE  AND ETHNIC  GROUP
Initial  Access  Current  Access
Factor  Average  Percent  of Firms  Average  Percent  of Firms
Score  Assigning  a Score of  Score  Assigning  a Score
01
*  ~~~~~~~~~4  1  4  1  5 I~~~~  ~  ~~~~  I  I 
Identffication  of Firm  r  3.5  45.5  212  3.9  30.3  48.5
by Foreign  Buyers  PI  3.5  16.7  33.3  4.0  33.3  50.0
or Export  Agents  NP1  3.7  58.3  20.8  4.2  -33.3  54.2
Direct  Efforts  by  T  3.2  9.4  40.6  3.3  15.2  36A
Firm  to Contact  P  1.7  16.7  0.0  1.2  0.0  0.0
Foreign  Buyers  or  NP  3.6  4A  52.2  3.8  20.8  41.7
Export  Agents
Support by Public  T  2.1  6.1  12.1  1.7  3.1  3.1
or Nonprofit  P  2.2  16.7  0.0  2.0  0.0  0.0
Agencies  NP  2.1  42  12.5  1.7  4.2  4.2
Subcontractng  T  2.4  3.0  21.2  L  . 6.4  6.4
Relationship  wifth  P  3.7  0.0  50.0  2.5  0.0  33.3





RELATIVE  IMPORTANCE  OF DIFFERENT  FACTORS  IN
TECHNOLOGICAL  CAPABILITY  OVER  THE LIFE OF THE FIRM
AND DURING  INITIAL  PERIOD  OF
DIRECT  ENTRY  INTO EXPORT  MARKETS  (RATTAN)
Ifetirne of Firm  Initial  Export  Entry
Factor  Average  Percent  of Firms  Average  Percent  of Firms
Score  Assigning  a Score  of  Score  Assigning  a Score
of
_  _  _  _  _  _  ___  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _4  5__  _  . 4  T  5
On-the-job  Learning  V  l  4.1  30.4  39.4  3.7  6.7  53.4
by Employees  and  P  4.0  35.7  35.7  3.3  14.3  35.7
Entrepreneur  NP  l  4.1  0.0  66.7  4.1  0.0  71.4|
Support  from Other  T  3.6  182  33.3  3.0  26.6  6.7
Providers  Extemal  P  3.5  14.3  35.7  2.8  28.6  7.1
to the Firm  NP  3.6  18.8  31.3  3.0  28.6  0.0
Entrepreneur/Owner's  T  2.8  27.3  15.1  3.0  23.3  23.3
Prior  Skills  P  2.8  35.7  7.1  3.3  28.6  28.6
NP  3.1  12.5  25.0  2.6  14.3  14.3
|Domestic  Employees  T  2.4  9.1  3.0  2.7  26.7  6.7
Prior  Skills  P  2.3  7.1  0.0  2.6  28.6  7.1





USEFULNESS  OF THE  TECHNICAL  SUPPORT  OF
VARIOUS  PROVIDERS,  BY ETHNIC  GROUP,  RATTAN  FIRMS
Sources  1  2  45  All  Mean
. . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Score 
Foreign  Buyers  r  3  2  9  B  11  33  3.7
. pb  1  2  3  4  4  14  3.6
NP°  2  5  4  5  16  3.6
Expatriate  T  19  3  11  33  2.6
Employees  P  10  1  3  14  2.1
NP-  6  2  8  16  3.4
Local  Buyers  T  30  1  2  33  1.2
P  13  1  1.1
NP  14  2  1.4
Equipment  T  19  10  2  1  1  33  1.6
Suppliers  P  7  6  1  14  1.6
NP  10  3  2  1  16  1.7
Subcontractor  T  32  1  33  1.0
Principal  P  13  1  1.1
NP  16  1.0
Firms  in Similar  T  15  9  6  2  1  33  1.9
Activities  P  7'  4  3  14  1.7
NP  6  4  3  2  1  16  2.3
Technical  Uterature  T  13  7  11  1  1  33  2.1
P  2  4  6  1  1  14  2.6
NP  10  3  3  16  1.6
Private  Consultants  T  27  1  1  1  3  33  1.6
P  11  1  1  1  14  1.6
NP  15  1  16  1.3.
IndustryAssn.  or  T  18  5  5  3  2  33  2.0
Nonprofit  NGO  P  6  4  1  2  1  14  2.1
NP  9  1  4  1  1  16  1.7
Foster  Father  T  31  1  32  1.1
P  13  1  14  1.2
Public  Support  T  30  1  2  33  1.2
Technology  Agency  P  11  1  2  14  1.5
NP  16
Other  T  23  1  4  3  2  33  1.8
p  8  1  2  -2  2  14  2.1
NP  13  1  1  16  1.5




EMPLOYMENT  OF EXPATRIATES,  BY CURRENT  SIZE  OF FIRM
AND ETHNIC  GROUP  BY ENTREPRENEUR
Current  Size  of Firm  (Number  of Workers)
c50  51-100 |_101-250  251-500  501-999  >1000  All
wortion  of  T  0/3  2/5  419  4/6  5/9  1/1  16/33
pb  0/3  2/4  2/5  2/3  1/2  0/0  5/14
,iloying  NP 0 - 0/0  01  1/3  2/3  4/5  1/1  10/16
.bltiates
a of  T  0.00  1.40  0.36  0.31  0.24  0.54  0.34l
atriates  P  0.00  0.00  026  0.23  0.08  0.00  0.17





USE OF COLLECTIVE  SUPPORT MECHANISMS BY RATTAN FIRMS,
BY  START-UP SIZE AND ETHNIC GROUP OR ENTREPRENEUR
. Pribumi  Non-pribumi  All
Number of Forms  5  o  5  o
Utiling  Support From:  50 or  51 or  50 or  51 or  50 or  51 or
Fewer  More  Fewer  More  Fewer  More
Industry  Association/
NGQ  6  2  1  6  7  8
Foster Father  1  0  0  0  1  0
Public Technology
Support Agency  2  1  0  0  2  0
Private  Consultant  3  0  1  0  5  0
Courses  6  1  J  0  6  7  E8
At Least One of the
Above/Total Number of
Firms  10/11  2/3  2/6  8/10  13/18  11/15
At Least One of the
Above with Score of At
Least 3a/Total  Number
of Firms  4/11  2/3  f  1/6  5/10  7/18  7/15
Notes:
* Refers  only to the first  four categories  since  firrns  were  not asked  to rate  the value  of the courses  they had
participated  in.63
TABLE  17
TOTAL  EMPLOYMENT  BY SURVEYED  JEPARA  FIRMS'
Size  Range  of  Percentage  Percentage  Percentage  In-
Total  Number  of  Total  Exclusive  Nonexcluuive  House
Employment  Firms  Employment  Subcontractors  Subcontractors Employees
1,000  or more  4  9,336  75.1  2.7  22.2
500-999  2  1,543  53.0  8.1  38.9
200-499  4  1,348  81.6  5.2  13.2
100-199  5  701  18.6  15.8  65.6
50-99  5  125  10.8  79.4  9.8
Less  than  50  4  104  0.0  28.9  71.1
Note:
I  n full-time  equivalents.64
TABLE  18
USEFULNESS  OF THE  TECHNICAL  SUPPORT  OF




1  2  3  4  5  Score  Respondents
FDreign  Buyers  7  1  4  2  9  3.2  18/23
Technical  Literature  14  1  4  0  3  2.0  11/22
Subcontract  Principal
(including  foster  father)  17  0  0  2  3  1.8  6/22
Industry  Association/
NGO  17  1  2  1  2  1.7  10/23
Materials Supplier  16  1  5  I  0  1.6  11/23
Similar Firms  13  2  1  3  1  1.6  9/20
Local  Buyers  23  0  0  0  0  1.0  2/23
Joint  Venture  Partner  21  0  0  1  0  1.1  2/22
Private  Consultants  22  0  0  0  1  1.2  2/23
Expatriate  Employees  23  0  0  0  0  1.0  0/23
Public  Technology
Agents  20  2  0  1  0  1.1  6/23
Product  Standards
Agency  23  0  0  0  0  1.0  0/2365
TABLE  19
SOURCES  OF SUPPORT  FOR UPGRADING  TECHNOLOGICAL  CAPABILITY
IN SPECIFIC  AREA  OF EXPORT  FURNITURE  FABRICATION
Design  Finishing  Construction  Wood Drying
Buyers  15  10  4  5
Literature  7  0  1  1
Foster  Father  Principal  3  0  3  0
Similar  Firms  2  1  3  2
Materials  Suppliers  0  8  0  0
Public  or NGO Support  0  7  2  6
Agencies
Joint Venture  Partner  0  0  0  1
Number  of Respondents  - 18  14  9  1066
TABLE  20
RELATIVE  IMPORTANCE  OF DIFFERENT  FACTORS  IN THE
TECHNOLOGICAL  CAPABILITY  OF GARMENT  FIRMS IN THE
INITIAL  PERIOD  OF DIRECT  ENTRY  INTO EXPORT  MARKETS
AND OVER  THE LIFE OF THE FIRM
Inital Export  Entry  Uletime  of Flrm
Factor  Average  Percentage  of Firms  Average  Pefcentage  of Firms
Score  Assigning  a Score  of  Score  Assigning  a Score  of
. ___  - 1-1  ____4  4  5
Support  trom Other  T  3.7  30.4  30.4  3.7  39.4  26.1
Provides  External  to  P  3.7  0.0  66.7  3.5  33.3  18.7
the Firm  NP  3.6  38.9  16.7  3.7  40.7  20.8
EntrsproenurlOwner's  T  3.2  13.1  34.8  3.0  18.2  182
Prior  Sklgls  P  2.3  0.0  33.3  2.7  16.7  16.7
NP  32  11.1  38.9  3.5  20.8  20.8
Domestic  Employes  T  3.5  21.7  30.4  2.7  242  3.0
Prior  Skdlls  P  3.7  33.3  33.3  2.7  33.3  0.0
NP  3.5  16.7  33.3  2.7  16.7  42
OnthaeJob  Leaning  T  3.0  8.7  30.4  4.1  12.9  58.1
by  P  2.6  0.0  33.3  4.3 -16.7  66.7
Employees  and  NP  3.3  11.1  33.3  4.2  13.0  60.9
Ent  reprneur  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _67
TABLE  21
USEFULNESS  TO GARMENT  FIRMS  OF THE
TECHNICAL  SUPPORT  OF VARIOUS  PROVIDERS
Sources  1  12  13  1  4  j  All  |Score
;__  _  _  _  _  _
Foreign  Buyers  T  8  5  5  B  6  32  3.0
P  2  1  0  2  1  6  2.8
NP  5  4  5  5  4  23  3.0
Expatriate  Employees  T  15  3  0  2  12  32  2.8.
P  5  1  0  0  0  6  1.2
NP  9  2  0  2  10  23  3.0
Local  Buyers  T  26  3  2  0  1  32  1.3
P  3  2  1  0  0  6  1.7
NP  20  1  1  0  1.  23.  1.3
Ecuipment  Suppliers  T  14  5  10  1  2  32  2.1
P  2  0  2  0  2  6  3.0
NP  11  4  7  1  0  23  1.9
0-100  3  0  1  0  1  5  .2.2
101-250  2  1  2  0  1  6  2.5
251-500  3  1  5  1.  0  ...10  .2.4.
>500  6  3  2  0  0  11  1.5
Subcontractor  T  19  3  4  2  2  30  1.8
Principals  P  1  0  2,  2  1.  6  3.3
NP  16  3  2.  0  1.  22  1.5
Firms  in Similar  T  11  4  6  7  4  32  ..  2.7
Activities  P  0  0  2  3  1  6  3.8
NP  9  4  4  3  .3  .23  .2.4
0-100  0  2  1  2  0  5  3.0
101-250  1  1  1  2  1  6  3.2
251-500  3  0  2  2  3  10  3.2
>500  7  1  2  1  0  11  1.7
Technical  Uterature  T  12  9  4  6  1  32  2.2
P  2  3  1  0  0  6  1.8
NP  9  6  3  5  0  23  2.2
tJoint  Venture  Partner  T  27  1  2  1  1  . 32  1.4
p  6  6  0.0
NP  19  1  1  1  1  23  1.4
Source: Survey  of garment  firms.68
.TABLE  22
USE  OF EXPATRIATES,  BY SIZE  OF GARMENT  FIRM,  ETHNIC  GROUP
AND  YEAR  OF FOUNDING
Current  Size  of Firm (Number  of Workers)
1-100  101-250  251-500  501-999  |_>1000  All
Proportion
of Firms  r  0/5  3/6  8/10  2/3  8/8  21/32
Employing  pb  0/3  0/1  1/2  0/0  0/0  0/0
Expatriates  NPC  0/2  3/5  7/8  2/3  8/8  20/26
Ratio  of  T  0.00  0.24  0.50  0.63  0.49
Expatriates  per  P  0.00  0.00  0.18  0.00  0.00
100 Workers  NP  0.00  0.00  0.55  0.63  0.49  :
a TotEd
b Pribumi
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